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Abstract
The paper studies a voting scheme where members of a committee vot-
ing sequentially on a known series of binary proposals are each granted
a single extra bonus vote to cast as desired - a streamlined version of
Storable Votes. When the order of the agenda is exogenous, a simple
su¢ cient condition guarantees the existence of welfare gains, relative to
simple majority voting. But if one of the voters controls the order of the
agenda, does the scheme become less e¢ cient? The endogeneity of the
agenda gives rise to a cheap talk game, where the chair can use the or-
der of proposals to transmit information about his priorities. The game
has multiple equilibria, di¤ering systematically in the precision of the in-
formation transmitted. The chair can indeed benet, but the aggregate
welfare e¤ects are of ambiguous sign and very small in all parameteriza-
tions studied. The theoretical conclusions are tested through laboratory
experiments. Subjects have di¢ culty identifying the informative strate-
gies, and tend to cast the bonus vote on their highest intensity proposal.
As a result, realized payo¤s are e¤ectively identical to what they would be
if the agenda were exogenous. The bonus vote matters; the chairs control
of the agenda does not.
1 Introduction
Consider a group of voters faced with a series of binary decisions, each of which
can either pass or fail. Decisions are taken according to the majority of votes
cast, but suppose that, in addition to a regular vote for each decision, each voter
is endowed with some "bonus votes" that can be spent freely over the di¤erent
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Foundation for 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decisions. This is the idea behind storable votes, a simple voting scheme designed
to elicit and reward votersintensity of preferences. By inducing a voter to cast
more votes on decisions considered relatively more important, storable votes
typically increase ex ante welfare, relative to simple majority voting.
One concern that previous work has not addressed is the potential for agenda
manipulation. Because storable votes allow voters to modify their "weight"
in decision-making by cumulating or reducing the number of votes they cast,
control of the agenda could be particularly important. The goal of this paper is
to take a rst step towards the study of storable votes with endogenous agenda.
Because agenda-setting problems are famously di¢ cult, and the storable
votes game quite complex, the paper exploits two simplications. First, the
storable votes mechanism is streamlined: in addition to their regular votes,
agents are endowed with a single indivisible bonus vote to be cast freely over
any of the proposals. The analysis shows that when the agenda is xed, this
simplied mechanism can be su¢ cient to achieve welfare gains over majority
voting. More precisely, the paper identies a simple su¢ cient condition guaran-
teeing higher expected utility relative to majority voting. Welfare gains always
obtain if the value of the bonus vote, relative to regular votes, is chosen cor-
rectly (in practice, is not too large), and either the number of voters is even or
large enough, or the di¤erences in intensity of preferences across proposals are
important enough.
Suppose now that one of the voters assumes the role of committee chair and
is granted some agenda power. The second simplication of the paper is to limit
such power to the order with which decisions are brought to a vote. At the start
of the game, the chair decides and announces the order of the agenda. Would
the chair choose the order so as to exhaust other voters bonus votes before
presenting his own favorite proposal, and then carry it through the strength of
his bonus vote, even with a narrow support and an e¢ ciency loss? And would
the e¢ ciency loss be magnied in equilibrium, as the other committee members
adjust their own strategies, possibly saving their bonus votes and failing to
register their intensity of preferences? Is the e¢ ciency comparison to simple
majority voting robust to the endogenous determination of the agendas order?
The main conclusion of the paper is that the agendas order in this framework
acquires the character of a cheap talk message: the chair is in a position to
transmit information about his priorities and his planned use of the bonus vote.
In line with the results of the cheap talk literature, the game has multiple
equilibria that di¤er systematically in the precision of the information conveyed.
A babbling equilibrium exists, where no information is conveyed, and the game
remains identical to the exogenous agenda case. But informative equilibria also
exist where, on the basis of their position in the agenda, voters are able to
identify decisions over which the chair is sure not to cast his bonus vote. When
only one such decision is identied, the information is very imprecise; when two
are identied, more information is conveyed in equilibrium, and so on up to the
fully informative equilibrium where all but one of the decisions are known not
to be targets of the chairs bonus vote, and hence the one decision over which
the chair casts the bonus vote is identied precisely. The ability of the chair to
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transmit information, and varying degrees of information, through the order of
the agenda alone may seem a bit "too subtle" to have practical implications,
but the result is quite intuitive if we interpret the cheap talk message as a norm:
it is perfectly plausible to think of committees where the chair is known always
to put on the table his highest priority decision rst, or second, or last; or his
least important decision rst, or second, or last, and so on.
In equilibrium, when information is transmitted the chair e¤ectively commits
to casting his bonus vote on a subset of decisions only. The commitment is
valuable because other voters refrain from competing with the chairs vote, and
the chair sees his probability of being pivotal increase on the decisions he cares
most about. As a result, the chairs expected utility is higher: the power to set
the order of the agenda is valuable. As for the other voters, the impact of the
information on their expected utility is less clear-cut: by avoiding competition
with the chair, in equilibrium they face higher competition from other non-
chair voters on the remaining decisions. The end result is ambiguous, as is
the expected aggregate welfare e¤ect. As for the quantitative importance of
these e¤ects, precise numerical results for all parameterizations I have studied
yield very small magnitudes. Briey then: granting control of the agendas
order to a chair need not change the game at all, if voters coordinate on the
non-informative equilibrium; if the game does change, it is through the possible
transmission of information, with a positive e¤ect on the chairs expected utility,
and an ambiguous e¤ect on all other voters. Even then the best guess is that the
magnitudes are very small. The welfare comparisons to simple majority voting
derived under exogenous agenda carry over with little change when the chair
controls the order of proposals.
But would voters be able to identify these rather subtle equilibrium strate-
gies? And if they do not, could the chairs power in fact lead to sensible declines
in e¢ ciency? The second part of the paper reports the results of a laboratory ex-
periment where subjects are confronted exactly with the voting game described
by the model. Not too surprising, they have clear di¢ culties identifying the
possible informative role of the agenda order, a hard task, and one made still
more di¢ cult by the multiple equilibria. Non-informative equilibrium strategies
best explain the observed behaviors, and even then the strategic mistakes are
higher than in the simple scenario with exogenous agenda. And yet, and this
is the interesting part of the results, because subjects in great majority still
cast their bonus vote on their highest intensity proposals, realized experimental
payo¤s track very closely the theoretical predictions of the non-informative equi-
librium. In fact, because theoretical predictions are quantitatively very similar
across equilibria, experimental payo¤s are almost indistinguishable from equi-
librium payo¤s for any of the equilibria of the experimental parameterization.
The theoretical analysis is conrmed: realized payo¤s replicate the payo¤s that
would obtain if the agenda were fully exogenous. The bonus vote does matter;
the chairs control of the agendas order does not, at least in the limited form
studied in this paper. Stronger conclusions will need to wait, but the paper
ends with some discussion of why the insight provided by this simplest agenda
game is likely to carry over to more general scenarios.
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This study is part of a larger research project studying the theoretical and
experimental properties of storable votes. First proposed in Casella (2005) and
studied experimentally in Casella, Gelman and Palfrey (2007) and Casella, Pal-
frey and Riezman (2008), storable votes resemble cumulative voting, a voting
system used in US corporate boards and local jurisdictions and allowing voters
to spread freely across multiple candidates a given total budget of votes. Cumu-
lative voting is designed to increase the representation of minorities (Guinier,
1994; Issacharo¤, Karlan and Pildes, 2002), and has been shown to do so ef-
fectively, theoretically (Cox, 1990), empirically (Pildes and Donoghue, 1995;
Bowler, Donovan, and Brockington, 2003) and experimentally (Gerber, Morton
and Rietz, 1998). It applies to single multi-candidate elections, and thus is a
tool of representative democracy; storable votes instead are designed for series
of binary decisions and apply to committee decision-making and direct democ-
racy. Like cumulative voting, storable votes make it possible for a numerical
minority to win occasionally, but in the case of storable votes the representation
of minority interests need not be a goal in itself; it is the result of giving weight
to votersintensity of preferences, and thus it is typically e¢ cient, in addition
to being fair. From a theoretical point of view, storable votes are related to the
mechanism designed by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007), and to the almost
identical voting scheme proposed independently by Hortala-Vallve (2006).
The literature on agenda games typically studies the introduction of di¤erent
alternatives when a single choice must be made among several (see for example
McKelveys (1976) classic paper, Ordeshook and Palfrey (1988) for an early dis-
cussion of incomplete information, and, for more recent contributions, Dutta,
Jackson and le Breton (2004) and the works discussed there). Here the problem
is di¤erent because all proposals are unrelated; each of them either passes or
fail, independently of the others. The possible importance of the agenda comes
solely from the existence of the bonus vote. The agenda game studied in this
paper recalls results and intuitions from the literature on cheap talk games, orig-
inating from Crawford and Sobel (1982). The specic model is quite di¤erent:
the message comes through an action that although not costly constrains the
remainder of the game; there are multiple agents, the game is sequential, and,
as the analysis will show, the strategic interaction between the players depends
non-trivially on the number of voters and proposals, and on the value of the
bonus vote. Yet, the multiple equilibria distinguished by the coarseness of the
information transmitted are clearly reminiscent of Crawford and Sobels result.
Similarly, the experiments recall experimental analyses of cheap talk games (for
example, Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1991; Sopher and Zapater, 1993. See Craw-
fords (1998) survey and discussion) but both the design and the goals are very
di¤erent. As opposed to allowing subjects to exchange messages and testing
whether the messages are truthful and whether they a¤ect the subsequent play
of the game, the experiments described in this paper investigate whether sub-
jects are aware that the order of the agenda can be used as a message, and have
as goal the evaluation of the welfare properties of the voting scheme, and their
robustness to strategic mistakes.
Finally, the topic invites comparison with the body of work studying infor-
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mation transmission and deliberation in committees before a decision is taken
by voting (starting with Austen-Smith, 1990; see also Coughlan, 2000, Austen-
Smith and Feddersen, 2006, and Gerardi and Yariv, 2007). But again the focus
is very di¤erent: the model of this paper is a pure private value model, where
individuals di¤er in their preferences, as opposed to a common value model
where individuals di¤er in their information.1 There is no deliberation, but a
single agent, the chair, is allowed to send a non costly signal.
The next section describes the model; equilibrium strategies and e¢ ciency
are studied in section 3 when the agenda is exogenous, and in section 4 when
the chair controls the order of the agenda; section 5 describes the experimental
design and the experiments results, and section 6 concludes. Most proofs and
detailed calculations are in Appendix A; experimental instructions for one of
the treatments are reproduced in Appendix B.
2 The Model
Consider a committee of n voters, meeting to decide whether or not to implement
T distinct proposals, fP1; ::PT g, each of which can either pass or fail. The T
proposals constitute the known, xed agenda of the meeting, and the committee
votes over the proposals sequentially. Each member i of the committee has a
preference over whether any specic proposal Pt should pass or fail and attaches
some importance to having the proposal decided in his preferred direction. Both
features of is preferences - direction and intensity - are summarized by a cardinal
valuation vit. Valuations vit are independently and identically distributed both
across proposals and across individuals according to the distribution G(v) with
support [ 1; 1], symmetric around 0. A negative valuation means that the
voter is against the proposal; a positive valuation that he is in favor. For each
proposal Pt, a committee member i receives utility equal to the absolute value
of his valuation jvitj  vit if the decision goes in the preferred direction, and
0 otherwise.2 Thus the sign of the valuation indicates the preferred outcome
for the proposal, while the absolute value indicates the intensity of preferences.
The utility from the entire meeting is the sum of the utilities derived from each
individual proposal.
In addition to a regular vote over every proposal, each committee member is
given a single indivisible bonus vote. The bonus vote is worth B regular votes,
where B can be smaller or larger than 1, and I will refer to B as its value. When
the vote over P1 is called, each individual decides whether to vote for or against,
and whether to cast 1 or 1 + B votes. If a voter casts 1 + B votes over P1, he
will be able to cast only his regular vote over each of the successive proposals; if
instead he casts 1 vote over P1, he retains his bonus vote for one of the successive
proposals. Voting continues in this manner until the last proposal, when any
1Ordeshook and Palfrey (1988) do discuss information transmission through straw voting
in a pure private value model, but, as noticed above, the focus is on a dynamic agenda game
where a single choice must be made among multiple alternatives.
2Only the di¤erence in utility between the two outcomes (passing or failing) matters.
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remaining bonus vote will be cast. Each proposal is decided in the direction
that receives more votes; in case of a tie, a coin is ipped.
When voting over any proposal, a committee member knows his own valua-
tions over all proposals and the set of voters still endowed with the bonus vote,
a set denoted by t. The committee member does not know othersvaluations
over any of the proposals, but the independence of the valuations and the dis-
tribution G from which they are drawn are common knowledge. The state of
the game at t is summarized by (t; t).
3 Exogenous order of proposals
Suppose rst that the proposals are voted upon in some pre-determined, publicly
known order.
3.1 Equilibrium
The analysis focuses on symmetrical Perfect Bayesian equilibria in weakly un-
dominated strategies. With independent valuation draws and weakly undomi-
nated strategies, all individuals vote in the direction they sincerely prefer. The
only question is when to cast the bonus vote. Because the direction of the
vote is always chosen sincerely, G is symmetric around 0, and valuations are
independent, the decision to cast the bonus vote will depend on the valuations
intensity, not on their direction. Denote by vi the vector of realized intensities
for voter i: vi  fvi1; :::; viT g, dened over support [0; 1]. If we call xit the num-
ber of votes cast by voter i over proposal Pt, then xit = xit(vi;t; G; t) where
xit 2 f1; 1 + Bg and
PT
t=1 xit = T + B. At rst sight, identifying equilibrium
strategies may seem di¢ cult: for a given vector vi the choice to cast the bonus
vote on proposal Pt in general may depend on how many bonus votes remain
available to the other voters. But when valuations are independent, the answer
in fact is very simple:
Proposition 1. (1) For all T; n, G, and B there exists an equilibrium
where each voter i casts his bonus vote over Pt if and only if vit = maxfvig.
(2) This is the unique symmetrical equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies
holding for all T , n, G, and B.
The proof of lemma 1 is in the Appendix, but the intuition is immediate.
If everyone else follows the strategy, at any point in the game the expected
number of bonus votes cast over any future proposal is identical. There is no
reason to postpone or anticipate casting the bonus vote - the only consideration
is the intensity of preferences. For specic values of n, T and B other equilibria
exist where voting strategies are not responsive to intensities3 ; however, as the
proposition states, the equilibrium identied here is the only one that exists
3For example, for n odd and B < 1 there is always an equilibrium where all voters cast
their bonus vote on the same proposal Pt, for any t 2 f1; ::; Tg. The voting scheme is then
identical to simple majority voting,
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for all parameter values. In addition, responsiveness to intensity makes the
equilibrium a natural focal point.
3.2 E¢ ciency
How desirable are the welfare properties of the mechanism? In this set-up there
is no reason to treat individuals asymmetrically, and a natural welfare mea-
sure is ex ante utility - expected utility before the realization of any valuation,
but given G(v) and the expectation that all voters will choose the equilibrium
strategy. Call pB the probability of obtaining the desired outcome when casting
1+B votes, and p1 the corresponding probability when casting only the regular
vote, noting from Proposition 1 that, when evaluated ex ante, pBt = pB and
p1t = p1 for all t. Ev is the expected value of the absolute valuation, or ex-
pected intensity, and Ev(k) the expected kth order statistic among each voters
T absolute valuations (hence the T th order statistics is the expected highest
absolute draw). Then expected ex ante utility over the whole meeting, EV , is
given by:
EV = pBEv(T ) + p1
T 1X
s=1
Ev(s) = (pB   p1)Ev(T ) + Tp1Ev: (1)
To evaluate the mechanisms performance, I compare EV to ex ante utility
in the absence of the bonus vote, when decisions are taken by simple majority,
EW :
EW = TpEv: (2)
The symbol p indicates the probability of obtaining ones desired outcome when
every voter casts a single vote:
p =
n+I 1X
z=(n+I 1)=2

n+ I   1
z

(
1
2
)n+I 1 (3)
where:
I =

1 if n is even
0 if n is odd
The Appendix shows:
Proposition 2. For all G, T , and n there exists a range of strictly positive
values for B, B(n), such that for all B 2 B(n): (i) If n is even, EV > EW .
(ii) If n is odd, EV > EW as long as Ev(T )=Ev > [T (n+ 1)]=[T (n  1) + 2]:
If the number of voters is even it is always possible to choose a value of B that
leads to a welfare improvement relative to simple majority. Not surprisingly,
welfare improvements relative to simple majority are more di¢ cult to guarantee
when n is odd, for the simple reason that majority voting performs much better
in that case. Whether the condition in the proposition is satised depends on
the distribution G, on n, and on T . Three observations are immediate. First,
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notice that [T (n + 1)]=[T (n   1) + 2] is strictly declining in n: all else equal,
the larger the number of voters, the less demanding the su¢ cient condition, and
the more likely are welfare gains. At very large n, there is always a value of the
bonus vote that leads to welfare improvements over majority voting.4 Second,
the e¤ect of the number of proposals T is less straightforward, because both
Ev(T )=Ev and the ratio [T (n+1)]=[T (n  1)+2] increase with T . Whether the
condition is more easily satised at small or large T depends on the distribution
G. Indeed, and this is the third observation, the shape of G plays a central
role. Suppose for example G(v) = jvjb = vb. Then Ev(T ) = Tb=(Tb + 1) and
Ev = b=(b + 1). With [T (n + 1)]=[T (n   1) + 2] strictly declining in n, if the
condition is satised at n = 3, it is satised at all n. At n = 3 the inequality is
satised strictly by all b < 1, and weakly by b = 1 (the uniform distribution).
More generally, for any T and n, the inequality is satised for all b  (n  1)=2.
What is the meaning of these conditions, and why is the inequality in the
proposition required? With the extra bonus vote, the probability of obtaining
the desired outcome rises when the bonus vote is cast, but falls in the case of
the other proposals. A welfare improvement then requires a su¢ cient wedge be-
tween the highest valuation and the mean valuation. The example of the power
distribution makes the point clearly. The ratio Ev(T )=Ev is strictly decreasing
in b. With b < 1, the density function is decreasing and convex, and the prob-
ability mass is concentrated around zero. Most draws will have small values,
but a draw may come from the tail of the distribution: the wedge between the
expected highest intensity and mean intensity is relatively large. The higher
probability of winning the vote over that one issue is valuable and overrides the
lower probability of winning the remaining, relatively less important proposals.
With b > 1, on the other hand, the density function is increasing in v, and there
is larger probability mass at higher valuations: most proposals are likely to be
considered important, and the ratio Ev(T )=Ev is relatively small. Increasing
ones inuence on a single issue is less valuable because it comes at the cost of
reduced inuence over others, still likely to be considered important.
It is important to note that the critical range B(n) identied in the proposi-
tion depends on n only: although we are assuming that G is common knowledge,
the mechanism does not require the planner to know the distribution of valu-
ations. The general lesson is that, although strictly positive, B should not be
too large.5
Example 1. Consider the example of G Uniform, and B = 1. To evaluate
more intuitively the welfare properties of storable votes and simple majority vot-
ing, express ex ante expected utility with either mechanism as share of expected
rst best e¢ ciency. Expected rst best e¢ ciency EV  is a voters expected util-
ity if each proposal is decided in favor of the side with higher total valuation (the
criterion that maximizes ex ante utility). Its expression, together with the ex-
4Casella and Gelman (2008) analyze in detail the scope of storable votes in large elections.
5The proof of Proposition 1 identies thresholds for B that decline monotonically with n.
The restriction is su¢ cient for welfare gains, but not necessary. All numerical simulations I
have run suggest that it is much stronger than needed.
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plicit equations for all relevant probabilities, is given in the Appendix. All three
criteria, EV , EW , and EV , are scaled by a plausible lower bound: expected
utility with random decision-making ER = TEv(1=2). The normalized vari-
ables 
BV  (EV  ER)=(EV  ER) and 
NBV  (EW  ER)=(EV  ER)
express the share of available surplus over random decision-making that the
mechanism is expected to appropriate. For the representative case T = 3 and
n 2 f2; ::; 21g, they are plotted in Figure 1, where the black dots correspond
to storable votes, and the red dots to simple majority. In the case of simple
majority, the red dots trace two distinct curves: a lower curve, corresponding
to n even, and a higher curve, corresponding to n odd. At n = 3, the two
mechanisms are equivalent (n = 3 corresponds to the highest point in the gure
where the black and the red dot are superimposed), but for all other n stor-
able votes outperform simple majority. The most striking aspect of the gure is
the stability of the storable votes welfare measure, as opposed to the predictable
sensitivity of simple majority to n odd or even. As n increases, the two variables
stabilize to a 5 percent margin in favor of storable votes.6
4 Endogenous order of proposals
A frequent reaction to the storable votes mechanism is concern about its ma-
nipulability. Suppose one of the voters had the role of committee chair and set
the order of the agenda. Could the chair choose the order so as to exhaust other
votersbonus votes before presenting his own favorite proposal, and then carry
it through the strength of his bonus vote, even with a narrow support and an
e¢ ciency loss? And could the e¢ ciency loss be magnied in equilibrium, as
the other committee members adjust their own strategies, possibly saving their
bonus votes and failing to register their intensity of preferences? This is the
question studied in this section. The setting is as follows: At the start of the
meeting the chair c announces the order with which proposals will be brought
to a vote. A voters strategy is, for all voters, including the chair, the choice of
the proposal on which to cast the bonus vote, and, for the chair alone, the order
in which the votes are called.
4.1 Equilibrium
A rst answer to the question comes immediately from the results established
so far. Allowing for an endogenous order of proposals need not reduce e¢ ciency.
Call P i the proposal to which voter i attaches highest priority: v

i = maxfvig.
Then:
Proposition 3. For all T; n, G, and B there exists an equilibrium where
the chair orders P c in any position on the agenda with equal probability, and
6The absolute improvement over randomness decreases with n. With G symmetric, for very
large n, random decision-making, majority voting and storable votes all approach e¢ ciency
asymptotically, although the percentage gain in favor of storable votes is maintained.
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every voter i, including the chair, casts his bonus vote over P i . The equilibrium
is identical to the exogenous agenda equilibrium of Proposition 1.
As discussed earlier, in this equilibrium the probability that a voter endowed
with his bonus vote at t will cast it over any of the remaining proposal is
constant. From the point of view of a di¤erent committee member, then, the
only criterion for casting the bonus vote is the intensity of his own preferences:
there are no gains from anticipating or postponing the use of the bonus votes.
The identical reasoning applies when the order of proposals is endogenous. If
the proposer chooses randomly, no information about his voting strategy is
conveyed; casting the bonus vote on their highest priority proposal remains a
best response for all other voters, guaranteeing that a random choice is itself a
best response for the proposer. The endogeneity of the proposalsorder has no
impact on expected outcomes.
This reasoning, however, already suggests the possibility of di¤erent equilib-
ria where the proposers choice of agenda order does in fact reveal information
about the chairs priorities and voting strategy. Consider the following example.
Example 2. Suppose T = 2, n = 3, B = 1 and G Uniform. Then there
exists an equilibrium where the chair c orders P c = P1 and casts his bonus vote
on P1 with probability 1; each of the other two committee members, j 6= c,
spends his bonus vote on P1 if and only if v1j  (3=2)v2j , and thus is expected
to cast the bonus vote on P1 with probability 1=3. There is also a second
equilibrium, mirror-image of the rst, where the chair orders P c = P2 and
always casts his bonus vote on P2; each of the other two committee members
spends his bonus vote on P1 if and only if v1j  (2=3)v2j , and thus is expected
to cast his bonus vote on P1 with probability 2=3.
Giving control of the order of the agenda to the chair can alter the game
because the agenda can be used to transmit information: the voting game be-
comes a cheap talk game. Through the order of the agenda, the chair can signal
his priorities, and thus his voting strategy; knowing on which proposal the chair
will cast his bonus vote then induces the other voters to modify their own vot-
ing strategy, supporting the chairs communication. Proposition 3 states that,
as usual in cheap talk games, the uninformative "babbling" equilibrium con-
tinues to exist: there is always an equilibrium where the message is ignored
and conveys no information. But the interesting question, as in example 2,
is the possible existence of equilibria where information is conveyed, and their
e¢ ciency properties.
I dene an equilibrium informative if, after the chairs announcement of
the agendas order, all voters identify the chairs highest priority proposal with
probability higher than 1=T . A fully informative equilibrium is one where the
chairs highest priority proposal is identied with probability 1. We know from
the literature on cheap talk games that informative equilibria exist if the inter-
ests of the player sending the message and of those receiving it are su¢ ciently
aligned (Crawford and Sobel, 1982). In this game, establishing a general result
is complicated by the fact that the commonality of interest between the chair
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and the other committee members depends on the impact of other votersbonus
votes on ones probability of being pivotal, and thus on the number of voters
and proposals, and on the value of the bonus vote. It is not di¢ cult to nd
examples where a fully informative equilibrium does not exist.7 But there are
also important examples where a fully informative equilibrium does exist. Call
P c the proposal to which the chair attaches highest priority: v

c = maxfvcg.
If we restrict attention to quasi-symmetric equilibria (in weakly undominated
strategies) where all voters who are not the chair play symmetric strategies,
then the Appendix shows:
Proposition 4. Suppose T = 2. (1) For all G and n and B 2 B(n) there
exist two payo¤-equivalent fully informative equilibria such that: (i) The chair
sets Pt = P c and always casts his bonus vote on Pt, t 2 f1; 2g; (ii) any other
committee member i casts his bonus vote on Pt if and only if vti  (n;G)vsi,
s 6= t, where (n;G)  1 and unique. (2) With T = 2 and B 2 B(n), these are
the only quasi-symmetric informative equilibria holding for all G and n.
Proposition 4 generalizes the result of Example 2 to arbitrary committee
sizes and preferences distributions, as long as the value of the bonus vote falls
in the set B(n) and there are only two proposals. The chairs relative intensity
of preferences is fully transmitted by the agenda order, and the other voters
incentive to cast their bonus vote on P c can be reduced by the chairs commit-
ment.8
When there are more than two proposals, an endogenous agenda allows for
the existence of multiple informative equilibria that di¤er both in the precision
of the information transmitted and in the expected payo¤s, again in line with
general results of cheap talk games. The chair always casts his bonus vote on
his highest priority proposal; the question is which position in the agenda such
proposal occupies. As in Proposition 4, there are equilibria where the proposal
is known to occupy a specic position in the ordering, and thus all other com-
mittee members can predict the chairs voting strategy with probability 1. But
there are also equilibria where the chair randomizes the position of his highest
intensity proposal over a subset of possible positions, and thus other voters can
predict the chairs use of the bonus vote only imperfectly. We can describe these
equilibria as encompassing the two cases of Propositions 3 and 4: when the sub-
set of proposals known to include P c is not strict and corresponds to the full
set of proposals, the equilibrium is uninformative the babbling equilibrium of
7T = 3, n = 5, B = 1=2 and G Uniform is one such case. Note that the denition of
informative adopted here refers to revelation of the chairs underlying preferences, as opposed
to predictability of the chairs strategy. It does not cover non-responsive equilibria where all
voters, including the chair, cast their bonus vote on the proposal in a specic position on the
agenda, regardless of intensities. As mentioned in footnote 2, such equilibria exist at these
parameter values whether or not the agenda is endogenous.
8An interesting question is whether the order of proposals can be used to convey informa-
tion about the chairs direction of preferences, as opposed to intensity. When preferences are
independent acroos voters and proposals, revealing the direction of ones vote can be counter-
productive: it induces allies to refrain from using their bonus votes on the issue, freeing their
votes for future use, when their preferences may well di¤er from the chairs. The Appendix
shows this must be the case when n = 3.
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Proposition 3; when the subset corresponds to a single position, the equilibrium
conveys all information the fully informative equilibrium of Proposition 4. In
all intermediate cases, when the subset is strict but larger than a single posi-
tion, the equilibrium is partially informative, the precision of the information
declining with the size of the subset of admissible positions. This multiplicity of
equilibria di¤ers from the "inessential" multiplicity of payo¤-equivalent equilib-
ria in Proposition 4; it is a substantive multiplicity that corresponds to di¤erent
informational contents of the message9 . Call P iS the proposal to which voter
i attaches highest priority among some set of proposals PS : viS = maxfviSg,
and P iT S the proposal to which voter i attaches highest priority among the
complement set PT S With an eye to the parameter choices that will be made
in the experiments, it is possible to show:
Proposition 5. Suppose n 2 f3; 4g and B 2 B(n). (1) For all G and
T there exist T payo¤-distinct equilibria such that: (i) The chair selects his
S-lowest intensity proposals, with S 2 f0; 1; 2; ::; T   1g, and arranges them,
in any order, in the rst S positions on the agenda; he orders the remaining
T   S proposals with equal probability in each of the last T   S positions; (ii)
the chair always casts his bonus vote on P c (and thus never casts it on the rst
S proposals); (iii) any other committee member j 6= c casts his bonus vote on
P jT S if v

jT S  (n;G; T; S)vjS , and on P jS otherwise. For all G, T , and
S, (n;G; T; S)  1 and unique. (2) These are the only payo¤-distinct quasi-
symmetric equilibria holding for all G; T , B 2 B(n) and n 2 f3; 4g. (The proof
is in the Appendix).
For future reference, note that with committees of 3 or 4 voters, B = 1
belongs to B(n): the proposition applies to environments where the bonus vote
is equivalent to a regular vote.10
The proposition restates the description of the equilibria in terms of two
sets of proposals, proposals in the rst S positions in the agendas order, PS ,
and proposals in the remaining T   S positions, PT S . In the equilibria the
proposition identies, the chair always orders his highest intensity proposal in
one of the last T   S positions, choosing each of these with equal probability,
and always casts his bonus vote on it. The other members of the committee
best-respond to the chairs strategy by privileging proposals in the rst S po-
sitions as targets for their bonus vote. The larger is S, the smaller is the set
of proposals over which the chair may cast his bonus vote, and the more in-
formative is the equilibrium: S = 0 corresponds to the babbling equilibrium
where no information is conveyed; S = T   1 corresponds to the fully infor-
9See for example the discussion in Crawford (1998).
10Although not stated for n = 2, the equilibria in the proposition hold in such a case too,
with (G;T; S)jn=2 = 1 for all G;T , and S. The reason is that when n = 2 casting the bonus
vote on ones highest valuation is a dominant strategy, for any G and for any T and S: the
increase in the pivot probability associated with the use of the bonus vote is exactly identical,
whether ones opponent casts the bonus vote or not. Thus whether the agendas order is
informative or not has no e¤ect on the strategy of the voter who is not the chair. Similarly
the chair can choose to transmit information through the agenda setting, or not to, with no
e¤ect on his own voting strategy. Welfare is identical to the exogenous agenda case.
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mative equilibrium where the chairs highest priority proposal is identied with
probability 1. The proof in the Appendix also shows that for all T > 2 , the
probability with which a non-chair member of the committee casts his bonus
vote on the chairs rst priority proposal declines monotonically with S: the
more informative the equilibrium, the more successful is the chair in crowding
out other votersbonus votes. Note, as remarked by Farrell and Gibbons (1989)
that the informative equilibria are substantially di¤erent from the equilibrium
with exogenous agenda: through cheap talk hard information is transmitted,
and strategies are supported that could not be equilibrium strategies when the
order of the agenda is exogenous.
In conclusion, as in the question asked at the start of this section, it is
indeed the case that setting the agendas order gives the chair the possibility to
achieve less competition with his own bonus vote. But this is an equilibrium
result: the other voters are not caught unaware by the chairs strategy, nor are
they tempted to counter it by hoarding votes. On the contrary, their decision to
cast their bonus votes disproportionately on the other proposals is their optimal
response. The question of the e¢ ciency impact of an endogenous agenda is left
open, and I turn to it now.
4.2 E¢ ciency
The existence of the non-informative equilibrium makes clear that granting con-
trol of the agendas order to the chair need not a¤ect e¢ ciency in any way. But
when information is transmitted, does e¢ ciency increase, or are there other
e¤ects creating losses for the voters?
Call EV Si the ex ante expected utility of voter i in the informative equilib-
rium where the chair is known not to cast the bonus vote on the rst S proposals.
With this notation, EV T 1i  EV FIi is is ex ante expected utility in the fully
informative equilibrium, and EV 0i = EV
NI
i , is ex ante expected utility in the
non-informative equilibrium. From the perspective of the chair, the ability to
reduce the competition for inuence over his highest intensity proposal is indeed
valuable. The Appendix shows:
Proposition 6. In all informative equilibria described in Propositions 4 and
5, EV Sc  EV Nc , with S 2 f1; ::; T   1g:
For the chair any informative equilibrium is at least weakly superior to
the non-informative equilibrium, and thus to the equilibrium with exogenous
agenda. Contrary to what one might expect, however, the di¤erent informa-
tive equilibria cannot be ranked: with more precise information, the chair faces
lower competition over his highest priority proposal, but more competition over
proposals in the rst S positions of the agenda. Depending on G, n, T , and S,
the gain may or may not compensate the loss, and it is not di¢ cult to nd ex-
amples where the chairs expected utility is higher in some partially informative
equilibrium than in the fully informative one11 .
11One such example is n = 3, B = 1, G Uniform and T = 10, where the chairs highest
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As for the other voters, the impact of the transmission of information on
expected utility is predictably ambiguous. Although it allows them to reduce
competition with the chair, it induces higher competition with the other commit-
tee members, all of which tend to shift their bonus votes away from the chairs
highest priority proposal. How the two e¤ects balance each other depends on
the parameters of the problem. Depending on n, T , B and G, committee mem-
bers who are not chair may fare better or worse in the informative equilibria
than in the non-informative equilibrium:
Examples 2 and 3. Suppose T = 2, and G Uniform. If n = 3 and B = 1,
then EV FInc < EV
N
nc . But if n = 5 and B = 1=2, then EV
FI
nc > EV
N
nc . Note
that B = 1 2 B(3) and B = 1=2 2 B(5), and thus both examples are covered
by Proposition 4.12
Predictably, then, the overall e¤ect of an endogenous agenda on expected
welfare is of ambiguous sign. Consider ex ante expected utility with equal prob-
ability of being chair, EV S . Whenever the voters who are not chair benet
from the informative equilibrium, EV S > EV N ; when they do not, the e¤ect
on expected welfare depends on the relative magnitude of the chairs expected
gains and the other votersexpected losses. For G Uniform and B = 1, Figure
2 shows ex ante expected utility in the fully informative equilibrium, relative to
expected utility with exogenous agenda and with simple majority voting, for the
two cases of n = 3 and n = 4, as function of the number of proposals. Each plot
has three series of dots: the two series of black dots plot individual expected
utility for the chair (the upper one) and for a voter who is not chair (the lower
one); the red dots plot expected welfare with equal probability of being chair.
The upper half of the gure, Figure 2a, reports the utility measures as share
of the corresponding measures with exogenous agenda (or equivalently, in the
non-informative equilibrium). Following Proposition 6, the chair benets in the
fully informative equilibrium with both n = 3 and n = 4. When n = 3, the
chairs expected gain is maximal with 2 proposals and declines monotonically as
the number of proposals increases; when n = 4, the magnitude of the gain is not
monotonic in T , reaching a maximum at 5 proposals, and declining thereafter.
The expected utility of a non-chair voter mirrors imperfectly the chairs, with
opposite sign: when n = 3, the loss is maximal at T = 2 and declines monoton-
ically as T increases; when n = 4, the loss is maximal at T = 4, and declines
at larger T .13 Expected ex ante welfare combines the impact on the chair and
on the other votersutility and results in a small loss when n = 3 and a small
gain when n = 4. Both individual and aggregate e¤ects tend to disappear as
the number of proposals becomes large, and the probability of competing over
the same proposal declines.
expected utility corresponds to the equilibrium with S = 8: in choosing where to order his
highest intensity proposal, the chair randomizes between the last two positions on the agenda.
12Precisely, if n = 3 and B = 1, EV FInc = 0:989EV
N
nc ; if n = 5 and B = 1=2, EV
FI
nc =
1:0001EV Nnc . Note the small quantitative e¤ects.
13 I have no intuition for the non-monotonicity of expected utility gains and losses when
n = 4 another illustration of the complicated interactions among the di¤erent parameters
of the problem.
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The lower half of the gure, Figure 2b, reports the utility measures as share
of the corresponding measures with simple majority voting. With G Uniform
and B = 1, if n = 3, expected utility with simple majority voting is identical to
expected utility with exogenous agenda and the bonus vote, for any number of
proposals, and thus the left panel of Figure 2b replicates exactly the left panel of
Figure 2a: in the fully informative equilibrium, the chair expects to fare better
than with majority voting, the other voters expect to fare worse, and the overall
e¤ect is very slightly negative. When n = 4, the bonus vote with exogenous
agenda leads to higher expected welfare than simple majority, and the panel on
the right of Figure 2b shows that the welfare superiority of the bonus vote is
conrmed when the agenda is endogenous and the equilibrium fully informative.
Whether positive or negative, in Figure 2 the overall e¤ect of the endoge-
nous agenda is small: the expected welfare change is at most of the order of
two tenth of a percent, relative to welfare with exogenous agenda. This is a
recurring result of all numerical examples I have studied: regardless of the dis-
tribution of intensities, of the value of the bonus vote and of the numbers of
voters and proposals, I have always found the welfare impact of the informative
equilibrium quantitatively small. Taken together with the existence, and empir-
ical plausibility, of the uninformative equilibrium, the regularity suggests that
the practical impact of allowing the chair to control the order of the agenda is
likely to be very small, ad thus to have little e¤ect on the welfare comparison to
simple majority voting. But what happens in practice is an empirical matter,
best left to experimental testing.
5 The Experiment
5.1 Experimental design
All sessions of the experiment were run at CESS, the Center for Experimental
Social Science at NYU, with enrolled students recruited from the whole campus
through the laboratory web site.14 No subject participated in more than one
session. The main treatment variable was the proposalsorder, decided either
exogenously by the computer, or endogenously by one of the subjects in each
group, in turn.
Subjects were matched randomly in groups of n members each, where n
equalled 3 in some sessions and 4 in others, and were asked to vote successively
over 3 proposals, named the Green, Red and Blue proposal. In addition to
one regular vote for each proposal, all subjects were endowed with a single
bonus vote, identical in value to the regular votes (B = 1). Valuations for all
three proposals were drawn randomly by the computer, independently for each
subject and for each proposal, and could assume any integer value between  100
and 100 (excluding 0), with equal probability. Before any decision was taken,
14A sample of the instructions from one of the sessions is given in Appendix B. The exper-
iment used the Multistage Game software package developed jointly between the SSEL and
CASSEL labs and freely available at http://research.cassel.ucla.edu/software.htm
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each subject was shown his or her own valuations over the three proposals. In
sessions where the order of proposals was chosen exogenously, the computer
selected the order randomly, independently for each group, and the monitor
showed it to each group member, together with a reminder that the order had
been selected by the computer. In sessions where the order was endogenous, one
group member was chosen as chair and given the task of deciding the order of
proposals. The order was then communicated to the other members of the chairs
group, together with a reminder that it had been decided by the chair. Subjects
were then asked to vote over the rst proposal, and could choose whether to cast
the bonus vote, or not. After the vote, the computer screen showed whether
or not the proposal had passed, and the number of bonus votes still available
to the other group members. Voting continued in this fashion up to the third
and last proposal, where all remaining bonus votes were cast automatically. A
new sequence (round) of three proposals was then repeated. At the end of each
experimental session, four rounds were chosen randomly, and subjects were paid
their cumulative valuation for all proposals resolved in their preferred direction
in those four rounds, multiplied by a pre-determined exchange rate, in addition
to a xed show-up fee. Average earnings were about $20:00 an hour.
The existence of multiple informative equilibria when the order of proposals
is endogenous makes learning particularly important and di¢ cult. To allow for
it, groups were not rematched but remained unchanged for an entire experimen-
tal session. Because valuations were private and drawn independently, across
both subjects and proposals, even with xed group membership there was no
natural scope for coordination. When the order of proposals was endogenous,
the same subject acted as chair for a xed number of rounds, specied in the
instructions. Each member of a group acted as chair in turn.
The experiment was run with four di¤erent treatments: n = 3; 4 for each
of two possible agenda orders, exogenous (X) or endogenous (D). Some of
the sessions included both exogenous and endogenous order (beginning with
the simpler exogenous treatment), and, as control, others did not. In sessions
with both treatments, a challenge was keeping the length of the experiment
reasonable, while allowing a su¢ cient number of rounds as chair to each group
member; in sessions with exogenous order only, again the experiment had to be
reasonably short to keep the subjects interest. Table 1 reports the experimental
design.
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Table 1: Experimental Design
Session n order # Subjects Rounds
s1 3 X/D 12 10/30
s2 3 X/D 15 10/30
s3 4 X/D 12 8/32
s4 4 X/D 16 5/20
s5 3 X 12 20
s6 4 X 12 12
s7 4 X 12 12
s8 3 D 9 18
s9 4 D 12 20
Because of a programming error, in the endogenous order treatment of ses-
sion s3 di¤erent members within each group were chair for a di¤erent and ran-
dom number of rounds (as opposed to all being chair for 8 of the 32 rounds).
The session will be singled out but I chose not to drop it because, by compar-
ison to the other sessions, it provides insight on the inuence of predictability
of the chairs strategy on strategic mistakes. To verify that holding the groups
xed did not a¤ect the results of the experiment, two of the exogenous order
sessions, s6 and s7, were run with groups randomly rematching after each round
of 3-proposal voting. The results from these sessions are indistinguishable from
the other results.
The experiment mirrored closely the theoretical model, and thus all theoreti-
cal results apply here. With specic values for the model parameters (n 2 f3; 4g,
T = 3, B = 1, G Uniform), the equilibria can be characterized precisely. When
the order of proposals is exogenous, there is a unique symmetrical equilibrium
where every voter casts the bonus vote on his highest intensity proposal. When
the order is endogenous, there are ve equilibria in all: the non-informative equi-
librium, replicating the exogenous order equilibrium; three payo¤-equivalent full
information equilibria, where the chair always orders his highest intensity pro-
posal either rst, or second, or third; and nally a single partially informative
equilibrium where the chair orders his highest intensity proposal either second
or third, with equal probability, and always orders rst his least intensity pro-
posal (See the discussion in the Appendix). The uniqueness of the partially
informative equilibrium is particularly interesting. With three proposals, the
only partially informative equilibrium corresponds to S = 1, or the chair never
casting the bonus vote on a proposal in one specic position of the agendas or-
der; the sequential nature of the game then ensures that the proposal on which
the chair never casts the bonus vote can only be the rst.15
15The intuition is not di¢ cult to see. Suppose to the contrary that the chair were expected
to order his highest intensity proposal as either P1 or P2, with equal probability, and thus
to cast his bonus vote either on P1 or on P2. The best response for the other committee
members is some voting strategy that treats their intensities over the rst two proposals
symmetrically, and compares the higher of the two to the intensity over the third proposal.
Now suppose that the chair has not cast the bonus vote on P1. Then he is certain to cast
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Equilibrium strategies and expected payo¤s are reported in Tables 2a and 2b
for the two cases of exogenous and endogenous order respectively. As in Propo-
sitions 4 and 5, the tables summarize the equilibrium strategy through a value
 indicating the minimum required wedge between the intensity of the proposal
receiving the bonus vote and the second highest intensity, distinguishing, where
necessary, between c, the chairs , and nc, for the other voters. When the
order of proposals is exogenous,  = 1 for all voters. When the order is endoge-
nous, c = 1 always, but nc depends on the equilibrium. In the uninformative
equilibrium, again nc = 1. In the informative equilibria, recall the distinction
between PS , the set of proposals known not to receive the chairs bonus vote,
and the complementary set PT  S , and the notation P iV indicating the proposal
in some set V such that viV = maxfviVg. Proposition 5 states that non-chair
voters cast their bonus vote on P jT S if v

jT S  encvjS , and on P jS otherwise,
for some equilibrium value enc > 1. I denote such a strategy by the notation
nc = (1; enc).
The expected e¢ ciency of the voting schemes is summarized by 
sv (
nsv):
the expected share of available aggregate surplus appropriated with storable
votes (without storable votes, i.e. with simple majority). In Table 2b, the
di¤erent equilibria are distinguished by the superscripts. With simple majority,
the endogeneity of the proposals order is irrelevant, and e¢ ciency is again
summarized by 
nsv, which is not repeated in the table. Finally, the last two
columns report EVc=EVnc (denoted in the table by C), the gain the chair is
expected to reap, relative to the other members of the group, in the informative
equilibria.
Table 2: Equilibrium strategies and expected payo¤s.
Three proposals, G Uniform, B = 1.
Table 2a. Exogenous order of proposals.
n  
sv 
nsv
3 1 :923 :923
4 1 :908 :804
Table 2b. Endogenous order of proposals.
n c 
NI
nc 
PI
nc 
FI
nc 

NI
sv 

PI
sv 

FI
sv C
PI CFI
3 1 1 (1; 1:17) (1; 1:26) :923 :922 :917 1:01 1:022
4 1 1 (1; 1:05) (1; 1:16) :908 :9086 :909 1:003 1:011
it on P2. But that makes P2 a worse target for a non-chair bonus vote than was expected
ex ante: the wedge required for v2nc over v3nc must increase. From the perspective of the
chair, the probability of a non-chair bonus vote on P2 declines. Thus P2 is a better target
for the chairs own bonus vote than P1; the chair cannot be indi¤erent and the equilibrium
unravels. The Appendix proves the uniquenessof the partially informative equilibrium for the
parameters used in the experimental design, but in fact the result extends to all partially
informative equilibria identifed in Proposition 5.
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With this parameterization, when the order of proposals is exogenous, the
bonus vote scheme is exactly as e¢ cient as simple majority if n = 3, and superior
if n = 4, when it is expected to appropriate a full 10 percent more of available
surplus. When the order of proposals is endogenous, the uninformative equilib-
rium persists unchanged, while in the informative equilibria aggregate surplus
as measured by 
 falls slightly when n equals 3, up to a maximum of about half
a percentage point in the fully informative equilibrium, and remains e¤ectively
unchanged (more precisely, increases at most by one tenth of a percent) when n
equals 4. In all informative equilibria, the change in aggregate surplus reects a
(small) improvement in expected utility for the chair, and a (small) decline for
the other members of the group. Expected utility is 1 to 2 percent higher for the
chair, relative to the other voters, when n equals 3, and 0:5 to 1 percent higher
when n equals 4. As the number of voters increases from 3 to 4, the deterrent
e¤ect of the chairs bonus vote declines because crowding with the other voters
becomes more costly, the thresholds ncs fall, and the relative advantage of the
chair decreases.
5.2 Experimental results
The experiments have two purposes. The rst is to see what strategies the
subjects adopt; the second is to evaluate the e¢ ciency of the storable votes
mechanism on the basis of the realized experimental payo¤s.
5.2.1 Strategies
The strategic behavior of the experimental subjects can be summarized briey.
Subjects have little di¢ culty playing the equilibrium strategy in the exogenous
order treatment, but nd the endogenous order treatment more challenging.
They make more strategic errors, relative to both uninformative and informative
equilibria, and nd the latter particularly di¢ cult. Given the multiple equilibria
of the endogenous order treatment, the observation is not surprising. However,
even in the presence of strategic mistakes, in all treatments they cast their bonus
vote disproportionately on their highest intensity proposal.
Before describing voting choices, it is useful to discuss briey the ordering
strategies of the chairs observed in the endogenous order experiments. Figure
3 plots the fraction of all subjects who, when chair, always choose the same
order of proposals, and an order that is consistent with an informative equi-
librium. In gure 3a the fraction is calculated over the full data set; in gure
3b, the results from the full data set (the foreground columns) are compared
to results obtained ignoring the rst two repetitions of each chairs rotation, to
allow for learning (the background columns).16 The light blue columns report
the fraction of chairs always casting their most intense proposal rst, second or
third in the agenda order. The dark blue columns report the fraction of chairs
16 In Figure 3b, session s3 must be ignored when allowing for learning because of the ran-
domness of the chairs tenure, and for consistency, it is ignored in both the foreground and
background columns. Session s3 is included in gure 3a. Notice that its impact is minimal.
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whose strategies are always consistent with either the same fully informative
ordering strategy (max same), or the partially informative ordering strategy
(min 1). When chair, around 40 percent of subjects always order their highest
intensity proposal in the same position (slightly less than 40 percent over the
full data set, and slightly more when allowing for learning), and among them
more than half order it rst on the agenda. The partially informative order-
ing strategy, where the least intense proposal is ordered rst, is less popular,
followed by about 15 percent of chairs. The regularities are interesting but
their interpretation is not immediate. They may reect an understanding of the
strategic role of the agendas order, but may just as well result from a simple,
plausible rule-of-thumb. More importantly, rigorously, the fully informative or-
dering strategy does not require that a chair always orders his highest intensity
proposal in the same position over the multiple repetitions: any sequence of or-
dering, if understood by the other voters, is consistent with a fully informative
equilibrium.17 This last observation does not apply to the partially informative
equilibrium, where the equilibrium ordering is unique: any ordering where the
chairs least intense proposal is not ordered rst contradicts the partially infor-
mative strategy. Although of course it is also true that in all cases the chair
may well alternate freely among all equilibria. The multiplicity of equilibria in
the one-match, three- proposal game translates into a much larger multiplicity
over the multiple matches played by each chair.
How these ambiguities are resolved matters for evaluating strategic mistakes
in the other subjectsvoting decisions. And because all restrictions on the set of
equilibria are arbitrary, it is important to allow for a su¢ cient number of alter-
natives to build condence in the robustness of the conclusions. I will describe
the experimental data in the endogenous order treatment in terms of deviations
from the following equilibria. First, the non-informative equilibrium (NI): all
chairsorderings are always interpreted as random.18 Second, the fully informa-
tive equilibrium (FI): any ordering by the chair is correctly understood as fully
informative by the other voters (who therefore always know the position on the
agenda of the chairs most intense proposal). Third, an intermediate, more real-
istic scenario: a chairordering is interpreted as random unless the chair always
casts his or her most intense proposal in the same position, in which case it is
understood as fully informative (FI=NI). Finally, a fourth scenario allowing
for partially informative strategies: a chairordering is interpreted as random
unless the chair always casts his or her least intense proposal rst, in which case
the ordering is understood as partially informative (PI=NI). The equilibria are
identied by the ordering strategy of the chair, and given such a strategy, the
other subjectsequilibrium behavior is pinned down uniquely. Notice that no
ordering decision by the chair can ever be interpreted as a strategic mistake.19
17Most naturally, some repeated pattern: for example, the chair casts the most intense
proposal rst, then second, then third, and then again rst, etc. But in fact, as stated in the
text, any sequence of ordering is consistent with a fully informative equilibrium.
18 If the chairs ordering is interpreted as random, any actual ordering by the chair is a best
response.
19 In contrast, the repetition at all matches of the partially informative equilibrium species
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I classify as an "error" each round of play (each three-proposal game) where
a subject does not cast the bonus vote on the proposal identied by his equilib-
rium strategy. Figure 4a reports the aggregate error rate - the total number of
errors divided by the total number of rounds played by all subjects - for each
experimental session, on the horizontal axis, and the experimental treatment
and equilibrium on the vertical axis. The lowest series of points, with verti-
cal coordinates indicated by X, corresponds to the exogenous order treatment;
the remaining series corresponds to the di¤erent equilibria of the endogenous
order treatment just discussed, starting with the non-informative equilibrium
(D NI), up to the top-most series, the fully informative equilibrium (D FI).
Yellow symbols refer to groups of 4 voters, black symbols to groups of 3 vot-
ers and the single red symbol to the 4-voter session s3, where chairs alternated
randomly; squares refer to the two D-only treatments.
With predictable variation across sessions, Figure 4a shows that error rates
tend to be lowest in the exogenous order treatment. In the endogenous order
treatment they are lowest when calculated relative to the non-informative equi-
librium, and highest when calculated relative to fully informative equilibrium
strategies. All but one D FI error rates and half of all D NI error rates are
higher than all X error rates. Errors relative to PI=NI and FI=NI equilibria
are intermediate, reecting the high frequency of chairs classied as playing non-
informative ordering strategies. The size of the group appears not to matter in
the exogenous treatment: there is no systematic di¤erence between n = 3 and
n = 4 sessions; whether the conclusion holds in the endogenous treatment too is
less clear. Session s3 is not an outlier, casting additional doubts on the impor-
tance of the chairs ordering strategy in inuencing voting choices. Predictably,
errors are particularly high in the D-only sessions, indicated by the squares.
This last observation suggests that it may be important to check for learning
e¤ects. If, plausibly, learning is harder in the endogenous order treatment, the
disparity in error rates between the two treatments could disappear when al-
lowing for learning. Figure 4b reports error rates calculated over three di¤erent
subsamples of the data, to allow for three di¤erent types of learning. The high-
est hurdle of the endogenous order equilibria is predicting each chairs ordering
strategy, and the rst way to allow for learning is to ignore the rst two matches
of each chairs tenure (and, for consistency, the rst two matches of the exoge-
nous order treatment). The results from these data are plotted in the left-most
diagram in Figure 4b, with label "Learning 1".20 Alternatively, we can think of
learning simply as adapting to the experimental setting and the computer pro-
gram, as is standard in most experiments, and we can control for it by ignoring
the chairs ordering strategy too, and because such ordering is in fact not observed frequently
in the data - about 45percent of the times, averaging over all chairs and sessions - the overall
number of strategic deviations, including both ordering and voting choices, is much higher.
Thus, because the requirements are more stringent, the partially informative equilibrium,
played over all repetitions, is a worse description of the data than any of the alternatives
described above, and I ignore it below in the discussion of observed strategies.
20 In this subsample, the data from session s4 are dropped, because dropping the rst two
matches of each chairs tenure is meaningless when subjects do not play the role of chair in
xed rotations.
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the rst ve rounds of each experimental session. The resulting error rates are
plotted in the central diagram of Figure 4b, with label "Learning 2". But ig-
noring the rst rounds of each session a¤ects the endogenous order treatment
only in the D-only sessions. Ignoring the rst ve rounds of each treatment,
as opposed to each experimental session, is a better alternative and addresses
the di¢ culty of learning equilibrium strategies (the third diagram in gure 4b,
with label "Learning 3"). Although allowing for the rst type of learning im-
proves the relative performance of the FI=NI strategies, in all three diagrams
error rates continue to be lowest in the exogenous order treatment; within the
endogenous order treatment they continue to be lowest when calculated relative
to the non-informative equilibrium, and highest relative to the fully informative
equilibrium. The conclusions are unchanged, and I ignore learning in what fol-
lows, reporting results for the full data set. Because the results from session s3
are not systematically di¤erent from the other results they will not appear with
a di¤erent symbols in the rest of the gures.
Figure 4 presents aggregate error rates, but a natural question is how much
heterogeneity in individual behavior is hidden by the aggregation. Figure 5
reports histograms of individual error rates, by treatment and equilibrium. Each
column represents the fraction of all subjects in the given treatment whose
individual error rate, in percentage terms, falls in the corresponding bin. In
both treatments, there is a fair amount of heterogeneity in behavior, but the
real outliers are few, and the di¤erences in aggregate error rates are a fair mirror
of individual behavior. In the exogenous order treatment, 77 percent of all
subjects have error rates below 10 percent; when the order is endogenous; that
fraction falls to 68 percent if we consider uninformative equilibrium strategies,
and 45 percent if we consider fully informative strategies. At the other extreme,
5 percent of all subjects have error rates above 30 percent when the order is
exogenous, but 12 to 13 percent do so when the order is endogenous, with
little variation across the di¤erent reference equilibria.21 Notice that although
strategic mistakes increase, even in the endogenous order treatment almost 70
percent of subjects cast their bonus vote on their highest priority proposal more
than 90 percent of the times. It is this continued sensitivity of storable votes
to subjects intensity of preferences that explains the results of the following
section.
5.2.2 Payo¤s.
The relative di¢ culty of the endogenous order treatment for the experimen-
tal subjects is not surprising: the multiple equilibria, and the subtleties of the
informative strategies are su¢ cient causes for confusion. The real interest of
the experiments is in asking how e¢ cient the voting mechanism can be in the
presence of these strategic errors. In particular, are concerns about the chairs
ability to manipulate the voting mechanism against the common good justied
21Because individual deviations from equilibrium strategies are reported as error rates, as
opposed to absolute numbers, they tend to be higher when the relevant number of rounds is
lower. Thus the measure penalizes the exogenous order treatment.
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when voters deviate from equilibrium strategies? How good a predictor of actual
outcomes can theory be then? In past experiments with exogenous agenda and
multiple bonus votes, subjects typically made strategic mistakes, and yet suc-
ceeded in appropriating experimental payo¤s that were remarkably close to the
theoretical predictions (Casella, Gelman and Palfrey, 2006; Casella, Palfrey and
Riezman, 2008). A similar conclusion holds in the present set of experiments.
Figure 6 plots, for both treatments, realized aggregate experimental payo¤s
in each session and compares them to the corresponding payo¤s had the subjects
played the equilibrium strategies (gure 6a), or in the absence of the bonus vote
(gure 6b). Payo¤s are expressed as normalized share of available surplus, 
,
and all payo¤s, whether with equilibrium strategies, with simple majority, or
maximizing the ex post aggregate surplus are calculated on the basis of the
realized experimental draws. Di¤erent colors are used for n = 3 (black) and
n = 4 (yellow) experiments, and the 45 degree lines make the gure easy to
read.
The panels of gure 6a report experimental payo¤s on the vertical axis versus
equilibrium payo¤s, on the horizontal axis. The upper left panel shows results for
the exogenous agenda treatment. The wider dispersion of the yellow dots, both
along and around the 45 degree line, reects the much lower number of n = 4
matches, and thus the higher variability of average intensities and aggregate
payo¤s. The experimental results match the theory very closely: as predicted,
the share of surplus appropriated by the subjects tends to be higher for groups
of 3 voters than for groups of 4, and in both cases the distance from the 45
degree line is small, indicating that the experimental results deviate little from
the payo¤s that subjects would have obtained had they all played equilibrium
strategies.
The remaining panels of gure 6a report the results from the endogenous
agenda treatment. The question is how good a predictor theory is, and thus it
is natural to compare aggregate experimental payo¤s, or equivalently mean pay-
o¤s, to the three payo¤-distinct theoretical equilibria (NI, PI and FI), without
concerns for the changing identity of the chairs, the repetitions of the game, and
the strategic di¢ culties experienced by the subjects.22 In the endogenous order
treatment, the number of matches with 3 or 4-member groups is comparable,
and there is no di¤erence in the dispersion of payo¤s for the two types of exper-
iments. Again, the experimental outcomes replicate the equilibrium results and
lie either on or very close to the 45 degree line. Surprisingly, this is true when
evaluated both relative to the uninformative and to the informative equilibria,
including the partially informative equilibrium, regardless of the larger number
of strategic mistakes.23
Figure 6b compares experimental payo¤s, on the vertical axis, to what they
would have been with simple majority voting, given the experimental draws.
22 In any case, as the gures imply, plots comparing aggregate payo¤s to PI=NI and FI=NI
equilibrium payo¤s are e¤ectively identical.
23 In the plot comparing experimental payo¤s to the informative equilibrium payo¤s, the
dots indicating sessions s3 and s4 are superimposed and appear as one (the higher of the two
yellow n = 4 dots).
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The rst panel, on the left, reports the results for the exogenous order treat-
ment: as predicted, in 3-member groups the experimental payo¤s are e¤ectively
identical to what they would have been without the bonus vote; they are sub-
stantially higher in 4-member groups, again the dispersion reecting the lower
number of n = 4 experimental matches. The predictive power of the theory
is conrmed for the endogenous order sessions: compared to majority voting,
aggregate payo¤s with storable votes are very similar, possibly just slightly in-
ferior, for 3-member groups, and clearly superior for 4-member groups. From
a practical perspective, the comparison of the experimental results to majority
voting is the important result of the paper. It shows both that storable votes do
indeed result in di¤erent outcomes: the bonus vote does matter, and that, in the
experiments at least, the endogeneity of the agenda order does not compromise
storable voteswelfare properties.
The larger number of strategic errors in the endogenous order treatment,
particularly but not only relative to informative equilibria, is not mirrored by
a noticeable decline in realized payo¤s. The reason is that although subjects
fail to grasp the subtleties of equilibrium strategies, for the most part they
continue to cast the bonus vote on high intensity proposals. Thus the bonus
vote continues to give weight to the voters intensity of preferences; it is this
aspect of the voting strategies that goes to the core of the voting mechanism
and is mostly reected in realized payo¤s. As mentioned earlier, the robustness
of the e¢ ciency results is a recurring feature of storable votes experiments.
Finally, did the chair succeeds in appropriating a larger share of the surplus,
relative to the other subjects? The theory predicts this would hold in the
informative equilibria only, but even then the quantitative e¤ect should be small.
By isolating the returns to the chair, the sample size is reduced to one third
(for n = 3 sessions) or one fourth (n = 4) of the original size, and the sampling
variability trumps the di¤erences in strategies. More insight can be gained by
aggregating the data over all sessions where groups have equal size, and reducing
the noise. In the n = 4 experiments, relative to other committee members, chairs
did better than they would have done in any equilibrium, whether informative
or uninformative, and better than with simple majority: the strategic errors
favored the chairs. The gain however was always small - averaging over all
subjects, relative to a non-chair voter, a chair increased his payo¤ by between
0.4 and 0.6 percent in all cases. In the n = 3 experiments, relative to non-
chairs, the chairs did better than they would have done in the non-informative
equilibrium, but worse than in the informative equilibria and worse than with
simple majority. Here the potentially larger gain available to the chair in the
informative equilibrium is compromised by the strategic errors. But again the
quantitative e¤ects are always very small, always smaller than 1 percent. In the
experiments, any distributional e¤ect is minor, if it exists at all.
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6 Conclusions
Storable votes are designed to elicit and reward each voters relative intensity
of preferences, and thus increase the e¢ ciency of decision-making and the rep-
resentation of the minority. One important concern however, is whether the
possibility to shift votes across decision makes storable votes particularly sen-
sitive to agenda manipulation. This paper studies a scenario where the set of
decisions to be voted upon is xed, but the chair controls the order with which
they are called to a vote. The game is then transformed into a cheap talk game,
where the chair can use the order of the agenda to transmit information about
his priorities. In line with the results of the cheap talk literature, several equi-
libria are possible, distinguished by the precision with which the information
is conveyed. When information is transmitted, it discourages the other voters
from competing with the chair, and increases the chairs expected payo¤. The
e¤ect on the other votersutility and aggregate welfare is ambiguous, and in all
parameterizations studied quantitatively very small.
In laboratory experiments, subjects have clear di¢ culties in identifying the
informative equilibria: while the individual chairsordering strategy is reason-
ably consistent, the informational content of the chairs strategy is not recog-
nized by the other group members. Nevertheless, because bonus votes are dis-
proportionately cast on hi intensity proposals, the experimental payo¤s are re-
markably close to the theoretical predictions, a robustness result already ob-
served in past storable votes experiments with exogenous agendas. In this pa-
per, the theoretical predictions are that the chairs control of the order of the
agenda should have a negligible e¤ect on the welfare properties of storable votes.
And this is indeed the nal conclusion of the experiments: the bonus vote does
matter; the chairs control of the agenda does not.
It is true, however, that the agenda power granted to the chair is minimal.
Even restricting the chair to control the order of the proposals, suppose the
order was announced sequentially, after observing how many votes have been
cast, as opposed to being chosen once and for all at the beginning of the game.
Would results change? Some equilibria of the game studied in this paper remain
equilibria here: the babbling equilibrium, where no information is conveyed, the
fully informative equilibrium where the chair always calls his highest intensity
proposal rst, and the partially informative equilibrium where the chair never
calls his highest intensity proposal rst. In general the other equilibria break
down because the uncertainty over the agendas order prevents non-chair voters
from comparing their intensities over decisions over which the chairs bonus vote
is expected, or not expected; other equilibria may well appear. But the game
remains essentially a game of information transmission, an interesting but, in
this setting, very subtle role for agenda control. At least in the equilibria that
carry over from this paper, the di¤erences in expected outcomes with respect
to an exogenous agenda remain minor.
How about the more interesting case where the chair controls not only the
order but also the content of the agenda? A plausible model would describe
voters facing a set of possible decisions, only a subset of which would be voted
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upon, with the chair choosing sequentially the next decision to be brought to
the table. I leave this problem for future work, but some preliminary thoughts
suggest that the insights derived from this paper may carry over. The di¢ cult
problem facing voters who are not chair is the uncertainty over which decisions
will be presented in the future. But this uncertainty is present even when the
sequential agenda is exogenous - it is a di¤erent problem from protecting oneself
from possible manipulations by the chair. Where agenda power matters is once
again in granting the chair the possibility to transmit information about his
priorities.
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8 Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. (1) To verify that the strategies described are an
equilibrium, consider is problem at any time t, where i 2 t. Voter i must
decide whether to cast the bonus vote on Pt or wait for a future proposal Pt+k,
k 2 f1; ::; T   tg. Call lt the number of voters other than i left with the bonus
vote at t; pBs (p1s) the probability of obtaining the desired outcome when
casting 1 + B (1) votes on Ps, and s the probability that a voter r 2 t and
other than i casts the bonus vote over proposal Ps. Given the symmetry of
G, at any s the probability of obtaining the desired outcome when casting the
bonus vote depends exclusively on the number of other voters who also cast the
bonus vote. Thus:
ptBt =
lX
j=0

lt
j

(tt)
j(1  tt)lt jpB(j)
where the superscript t indicates the time at which the probability is evaluated,
and pB(j) is the probability of obtaining the desired outcome when i and j other
voters cast the bonus vote and all others do not. In the candidate equilibrium
tt = 1=(T   t). Thus:
ptBt =
lX
j=0

lt
j

1
T   t
j 
T   t  1
T   t
lt j
pB(j) (A.1)
Similarly, evaluated at t, the probability of obtaining the desired outcome when
casting the bonus vote at t+ k is given by:
ptBt+k =
lX
j=0

lt
j
"k 1Y
s=0
(1  tt+s)tt+k
#j "
1 
k 1Y
s=0
(1  tt+s)tt+k
#lt j
pB(j)
(A.2)
But in the candidate equilibrium tt+s = 1=(T   t  s). The probabilities in the
square brackets of equation (A.2) simplify, and we obtain:
ptBt+k =
lX
j=0

lt
j

1
T   t
j 
T   t  1
T   t
lt j
pB(j) = p
t
Bt (A.3)
Following the same logic, we can show pt1t = p
t
1t+k. At time t voter i decides
whether to cast the bonus vote on Pt or Pt+k by evaluating the di¤erence in
expected utility from the two actions: Eui(Pt)   Eui(Pt+k) = vt(ptBt   pt1t)  
vt+k(p
t
Bt+k pt1t+k) = (ptB pt1)(vt vt+k). Since ptB  pt1 , casting the bonus vote
on Pt if vt > vt+k is a best response response strategy for i for all k 2 f1; ::; T tg
and all t: the candidate equilibrium is indeed an equilibrium.
(2) To establish part (2), note rst that the strategy described in the lemma
is a best response for all other votersstrategies that result in ptBs = p
t
B and
pt1s = p
t
1 for all s. But with iid valuations, all strategies that depend exclusively
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on relative valuations have this property. Thus no strategy of the type: cast the
bonus vote on the kth higher valuation with probability k can be an equilibrium
unless k = 1 and k = 1. If another equilibrium exists, it must involve strategies
where voters di¤erentiate among the proposals on the basis of their order. For
our purposes it is su¢ cient to show that no such equilibrium exists for specic
values of n, T , and B. Suppose for example n = 3 and B = 1, and consider
a candidate equilibrium where all voters but i cast the bonus vote on some
proposal Pr with probability 1r = qr. With no loss of generality, suppose qr >
1=T . There must then exist at least one proposal Ps for which 1s = qs < 1=T .
With n = 3 and B = 1, p11t = 3=4  [qt(1  qt)]=4, and p1Bt = 3=4+ [(1  qt)2]=8.
Voter is best response is to cast the bonus vote on Pr over Pt if vr=vt > (p1Bt 
p11t)=( p
1
Br  p11r) for all t; and similarly on Ps over Pt if vs=vt > (p1Bt  p11t)=(
p1Bs  p11s) for all t; It is easy to verify that if qr > qs, ( p1Br  p11r) < ( p1Bs 
p11s), and thus if voter i plays his best response strategy, he must be expected
to cast the bonus vote on Pr with some probability 1ri < 
1
si: no symmetrical
equilibrium exists for q 6= 1=T . Symmetrical equilibria where voters di¤erentiate
among the proposals on the basis of their order do exist for di¤erent values of
n, T , and B. For example, as stated in footnote 2, for all n odd and B < 1,
there is an equilibrium where every voter casts the bonus vote on proposal Pt,
8t 2 f1; ::; Tg.
Proof of Proposition 2. The probabilities pB and p1 in (1) depend on
the value of the bonus vote. The proof proceeds by verifying the proposition
at the smallest value of the bonus vote for which the voting mechanism di¤ers
from simple majority voting, and thus pB 6= p 6= p1.
(1) Consider rst the case of n even. Any positive value of the bonus vote,
no matter how small, a¤ects the outcome with positive probability: there is
always a positive probability that the voters are exactly split and that one more
voter on one side than on the other casts the bonus vote. Consider then a value
of the bonus vote small enough that as long as the two groups are not equally
split, the bonus votes cannot modify the outcome. This threshold is dened by
the condition that a minority of size n=2   1 casting all bonus votes does not
win over a majority of size n=2 + 1 casting no bonus votes, or:
(
n
2
  1)(1 +B) < (n
2
+ 1)() B < 4
n  2
We can now derive pB and p1 for all values of B 2 (0; 4=(n   2)). The only
di¤erence with respect to simple majority voting can arise when the voters are
split into groups of equal size. In this case, simple majority yields a tie, but
the existence of the bonus vote creates many possible congurations of voting
choices for which one side strictly wins. Consider the problem from the point
of view of voter i. It turns out to be simpler to isolate a second voter j on the
opposite side of i. Whenever voter j casts the same number of votes as i, the
probability that is side wins equals the probability that js side wins, and the
expected deviations from simple majority cancel out. The relevant cases are
those where i and j cast a di¤erent number of votes. In calculating pB then,
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the deviation from p occurs when j does not cast the bonus vote. Call Mi the
number of voters on is side who vote 1 + B, ignoring i, and similarly Mj the
number of voters on js side who vote 1 + B, ignoring j. It is immediate that
is side wins if Mi > Mj   1. Similarly, is side ties if Mi =Mj   1 and loses if
Mi < Mj   1. Thus:
pB = p+

1
2
n 1
n  1
n=2

T   1
T

1
2
prob(Mi > Mj   1)  1
2
prob(Mi < Mj   1)

where (T   1)=T is the probability that voter j casts a single vote, and the
probabilities inside the square brackets are multiplied by (1=2) because, absent
the bonus vote, the relevant events would result in a tie. But prob (Mi > Mj  
1) = prob(Mi = Mj) + prob(Mi > Mj), and prob (Mi < Mj   1) = prob(Mi <
Mj)   prob(Mi = Mj   1). And since prob(Mi > Mj) = prob(Mi < Mj), we
can write:
pB = p+

1
2
n
n  1
n=2

T   1
T

[prob(Mi =Mj) + prob(Mi =Mj   1)]
(A.4)
Similarly,
p1 = p 

1
2
n
n  1
n=2

1
T

[prob(Mi =Mj) + prob(Mi =Mj + 1)] (A.5)
The problem is symmetrical, and thus prob(Mi =Mj 1) = prob(Mj =Mi 1):
the expressions in square brackets in (A.4) and (A.5) are identical. Call them
C. We can now write:
pB   p1 =

1
2
n
n  1
n=2

C (A.6)
p  p1 =

1
2
n
n  1
n=2

1
T

C (A.7)
We know from (1) that:
EV > EW () Ev(T )(pB   p1) > TEv(p  p1) (A.8)
Substituting (A.6) and (A.7), we obtain:
EV > EW () Ev(T ) > TEv

1
T

or Ev(T ) > Ev
which is always satised. We can conclude that if n is even, ex ante e¢ ciency
strictly improves over simple majority voting for all values of B 2 (0; 4=(n 2)).
Note that if n = 2, the value of the bonus vote is unconstrained.
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(2) Consider now the case of n odd. With n odd, there are strictly positive
values of the bonus vote that never alter the voting outcome from what it would
be with simple majority. These are values such that when the voters are divided
into two groups with opposite preferences of sizes as similar as possible ((n 1)=2
on one side, and (n   1)=2 + 1 on the other), the minority loses even when all
voters on the minority side cast their bonus vote, and none of the voters on the
majority side does so. Or:
(
n  1
2
)(1 +B) < (
n  1
2
+ 1), B < 2
n  1
For all B < 2=(n   1) and n odd, then trivially EV  EW .24 Suppose then
B  2=(n   1), but suppose also that the bonus vote is small enough not to
matter in any other possible conguration of votes. The next smallest threshold
is given by a value of B such that when the two groups with opposite preferences
are of sizes (n   1)=2, and (n   1)=2 + 1 and none of the majority voters uses
the bonus vote while all but one of the minority voters do so, the result is a tie.
I.e.:
(
n  1
2
)(1 +B) B = n+ 1
2
, B = 2
n  3
Suppose then B 2 [2=(n   1); 2=(n   3)). From the point of view of voter i,
when casting the bonus vote the probability of obtaining the desired outcome
di¤ers from the simple majority case only if he nds himself in a minority of
size (n   1)=2 and all of the voters on his side cast the bonus vote, while none
of the majority voters do so. Or:
pB = p+

1
2
n 1+Itie  n  1
(n+ 1)=2

1
T
(n 3)=2
T   1
T
(n+1)=2
(A.9)
where Itie = 1 if B = 2=(n  1), and 0 if B 2 (2=(n  1); 2=(n  3)).
Similarly, when casting a single vote the di¤erence with respect to simple
majority comes from the possibility of losing, even when belonging to the ma-
jority, if all minority voters cast the bonus vote and none of the majority voters
do so:
p1 = p 

1
2
n 1+Itie  n  1
(n  1)=2

1
T
(n 1)=2
T   1
T
(n 1)=2
(A.10)
where the di¤erence in the binomial term reects the di¤erent size of the two
groups and the fact that pB in (A.9) is calculated supposing that voter i is in
the minority group, and p1 in (A.10) supposing i is in the majority. Hence:
pB p1 =

1
2
n 1+Itie  1
T
(n 1)=2
T   1
T
(n 1)=2 
n  1
(n+ 1)=2

(T   1) +

n  1
(n  1)=2

(A.11)
24A simple example makes the point clearly. Suppose n = 3. Then for all B < 1, a voter
can win only if at least one of the other two voters agrees with him, exactly as in the case of
simple majority voting
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Substituting (A.10) and (A.11) in (A.8):
EV > EW () D

Ev(T )

T (n  1) + 2
n+ 1

  TEv

> 0
where:
D 

1
2
n 1+Itie  1
T
(n 1)=2
T   1
T
(n 1)=2
n  1
(n  1)=2

> 0
Or:
EV   EW > 0() Ev(T )
Ev
>
T (n+ 1)
T (n  1) + 2
This is the condition in Proposition 2.
Construction of Figure 1.
(a) Derivation of p1, pB for arbitrary B.
Consider the problem from the point of view of voter i. The expected voting
behavior of the other voters is identical over all proposals. Consider then a
proposal P , and call  the ex ante probability that any voter casts the bonus
vote on that proposal (where in equilibrium  = 1=T ). Call J the number of
other voters who cast the bonus vote. Excluding i, the total number of votes
cast in the election is n  1+BJ . Call Mi (mi) the number of voters on is side
who vote 1+B (1) over P , and thus mi+(1+B)Mi the total number of votes on
is side, ignoring i, and n 1+BJ mi (1+B)Mi the total number of votes on
the opposite side. If voter i casts only his regular vote, for any Mi and J , voter
is side wins strictly if: mi+ (1+B)Mi+1 > n  1+BJ  mi  (1+B)Mi, or
mi > [n+B(J 2Mi)]=2 1 Mi; and ties if mi = [n+B(J 2Mi)]=2 1 Mi.
Taking into account that for generic n, J , and B [n+B(J   2Mi)]=2 need not
be an integer, we can write:
p1 =
n 1X
J=0

n  1
J
 JX
Mi=0

J
Mi
"n 1 JX
mi=k

n  1  J
mi

+
II
2

n  1  Jek
#
J(1 )n 1 J(1=2)n 1
with:
k  I[n+B(J   2Mi)
2
] Mi
where I[x] is the largest integer smaller than x;
ek  n+B(J   2Mi)
2
  1 Mi,
II =

1 if ek is an integer
0 otherwise
If voter i casts his bonus vote, then for any Mi and J , voter is side wins
strictly if: mi + (1 + B)Mi + 1 + B > n  1 + BJ  mi   (1 + B)Mi, or mi >
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[n+B(J 1 2Mi)]=2 1 Mi; and ties if mi = [n+B(J 1 2Mi)]=2 1 Mi.
We can write:
pB =
n 1X
J=0

n  1
J
 JX
Mi=0

J
Mi
"n 1 JX
mi=kB

n  1  J
mi

+
II
2

n  1  JfkB
#
J(1 )n 1 J(1=2)n 1
with:
kB  I[n+B(J   1  2Mi)
2
] Mi
where I[x] is the largest integer smaller than x;
ekB  n+B(J   1  2Mi)
2
  1 Mi;
II =

1 if ekB is an integer
0 otherwise
(b) E¢ ciency
Expected rst best e¢ ciency is given by:
EV  = (1=2)n 1
"
1=2 +
n 2X
k=0

n  1
k
 Z k
0
(1=2)f(x)dx+
Z k+1
k
Z 1
x k
sdsf(x)dx
!#
where f is the density function of a sum of n  1 independent variables. When
the n 1 variables are each distributed according to a Uniform over the interval
[0; 1]:
f(x) =
nX
k=0
( 1)k

n  1
k

(x  k)n 2Sign[x  k] 1
2(n  2)!
Proof of Proposition 4. I begin by studying the rst candidate equilib-
rium. Recall that each voter i, including the chair, decides whether to cast the
bonus vote on P1 or P2 by evaluating the di¤erence in expected utility from the
two actions: Eui(P1) Eui(P2) = vi1(piB1   pi11)  vi2(piB2   pi12), where all
probabilities are evaluated at the time of the rst decision. Any voters best
response strategy is to cast the bonus vote on P1 if and only if:
vi1
vi2
 piB2   pi12
piB1   pi11 (A.12)
where i = c if the voter is the chair, and I ignore the subscript otherwise.
Restricting the value of the bonus vote to B 2 B(n) allows us to calculate
(A.12) and establish its properties.
(1) Suppose rst that n is even. The derivation of the relevant probabilities
proceeds as in the proof of Proposition 2. Consider rst the problem for a voter
i who is not the chair, and begin by deriving pB1, the probability of winning
P1 when casting the bonus vote. Recall that B < 4=(n   2), implying that
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the bonus vote can make a di¤erence only if the two groups on opposite side
of any proposal are of equal size. With probability 1=2, the chair is against i,
the chairs bonus vote cancels is, and pB1 = p (where p is the probability of
winning P1 under simple majority). With probability 1=2, the chair is on is
side. In this case, consider two voters on the opposite side, one of whom I call
j. If both cast their bonus votes, again pB1 = p. However, if either one or
both do not cast their bonus vote, then pB1 > p. Working through the di¤erent
scenarios, we can derive:
pB1 = p+

1
2
n 1
n  2
n=2

(1  1)A11 + (1 + 1)
2
A01 +
(1  1)
2
A21

where A0t, A1t, and A2t are dened as:
A0t  prob(Mit =Mjt) =
n=2 2X
M=0

n=2  2
M

n=2  2
M

2Mt (1  t)n 4 2M
A1t  prob(Mit =Mjt + 1) =
n=2 3X
M=0

n=2  2
M

n=2  2
M + 1

2M+1t (1  t)n 5 2M
A2t  prob(Mit =Mjt + 2) =
n=2 4X
M=0

n=2  2
M

n=2  2
M + 2

2M+2t (1  t)n 6 2M ;
and Mit (Mjt) is dened as the number of voters on is (js) side, up to a
maximum of n=2  2 who cast the bonus vote on Pt. The maximum is n=2  2
because we always exclude voter i and account separately for the chair, and, to
keep the two sides balanced, for j and one other voter on js side. The details
are cumbersome but not di¢ cult, and we obtain25 :
pB1   p11 =

1
2
n 1
n  2
n=2
 
(A11 +A01) + (A21  A01) (1  1)2

+(A.13)
+

n  2
n=2  1

[(A11 +A01) + (A21  A01)1(1  1)]

When deriving pB2   p12, on the other hand, voter i knows that the chair will
not cast the bonus vote, and thus the expression will not be exactly symmetrical
to (A.13). Again the details are somewhat cumbersome, but the logic straight-
forward. The expression is:
pB2   p12 =

1
2
n 1
n  2
n=2
 
(A12 +A02) + (A22  A02)22

+(A.14)
+

n  2
n=2  1

[(A12 +A02) + (A22  A02)2(1  2)]

With T = 2, 1 = 1   2, and simple manipulations show that for all 1;
A11 = A12; A01 = A02, and A21 = A22. It follows that pB1   p11 = pB2   p12.
25The detailed derivation is available upon request.
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A voter i who is not the chair should cast the bonus vote on P1 if and only if
vi1  vi2. Hence (n;G) = 1, and 1 = 1=2.
Consider now the chairs problem. Given 1 = 1=2 = 2, the chairs best
response is simply to cast his bonus vote on the proposal to which he attaches
highest valuation. Thus if vc1  vc2, always casting the bonus vote on P1 is
indeed supported as an equilibrium strategy. But we also know from Proposition
3 that with 1 = 1=2 = 2 from the point of view of the chair the order of
proposals is irrelevant, and choosing P1 such that vc1  vc2 is consistent with
the chairs best response.
We can conclude that if n is even and T = 2, there is indeed an equilibrium
where vc1  vc2, xc1 = 1 + B, and x1 = 1 + B if and only if v1  v2, or
equivalently (n;G) = 1 for all G. The equilibrium is fully informative because
it is common knowledge that the chair always orders his higher priority proposal
rst.
(2) Suppose now that n is odd. Again consider rst the problem for a voter i
who is not the chair. Recall that B 2 B(n) = [2=(n 1); 2=(n 3)), implying that
the bonus vote makes a di¤erence over simple majority only when the groups
on opposite sides of a proposal di¤er in size by a single voter; all minority
voters cast the bonus vote, and none of the majority does. In the candidate
equilibrium, the chair always casts his bonus vote on P1. Thus pB1 6= p only if
the chair is on i0s side and so are (n   1)=2   2 other voters, all of which cast
their bonus vote, while none of the others do. That is:
pB1 = p+

1
2
n 1+Itie  n  2
(n+ 1)=2


(n 5)=2
1 (1  1)(n+1)=2 (A.15)
The same logic allows us to derive p11, pB2, and p12, and we obtain:
pB1 p11 =

1
2
n 1+Itie

(n 5)=2
1 (1 1)(n 1)=2

n  2
(n+ 1)=2

(1  1) +

n  2
(n  1)=2

1

(A.16)
and:
pB2   p12 =

1
2
n 1+Itie  n  2
(n  1)=2

[2(1  2)](n 3)=2 (A.17)
In the candidate equilibrium 1 2 (0; 1) and the ratio of (A.17) to (A.16) is well
dened. Expanding the binomial terms and simplifying, we can write:
pB2   p12
pB1   p11 =

2(1  2)
1(1  1)
(n 3)=2
1
1  1

n+ 1
n  3 + 41

(A.18)
Taking into account that 1 = 1  2, (A.18) simplies to:
pB2   p12
pB1   p11 =

1
1  1

n+ 1
n  3 + 41

 (1)
Voter is best response strategy is to cast the bonus vote on P1 if vi1 
(1)vi2. Given c1 = 1, a symmetrical best response by all voters who are not
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the chair amounts to nding a value of 1 that solves 1 = prob(v1  (1)v2),
or:
1 =
Z 1
0
F (

v
(1)

dF (v) (A.19)
With v1 and v2 independent and distributed according to F , the strategy de-
scribed in Proposition 4 is a symmetrical best response if and only if, for all n
and G, there exists a solution to (A.19) at some e1 2 (0; 1=2]. For given n and
G, call the right-hand side of (A.19) '(1). The function '(1) is continuous
in 1 and for all n  3, @(1)=@1 > 0, implying that @'(1)=@1  0. But
lim1!0 (1) = 0, and hence lim1!0 '(1) = 1, while (1=2) = (n+ 1)=(n 
1) > 1 for all nite n, and hence '(1=2) < 1=2. Thus there exists a uniquee1 2 (0; 1=2) such that e1 = '(e1), or equivalently a unique (n;G) > 1: the
statement in the Proposition is veried.
Consider now the chairs problem. The logic is unchanged. From the chairs
point of view, pcBt 6= p only if the chair is in a minority of size (n  1)=2 all of
whose members cast their bonus vote, while none of the others do. That is:
pcBt = p+

1
2
n 1+Itie  n  1
(n+ 1)=2


(n 3)=2
t (1 t)(n+1)=2 t = 1; 2: (A.20)
Similarly, pc1t 6= p only if the chair is in a majority of size (n + 1)=2 none of
whose members cast their bonus vote, while all of the others do:
pc1t = p 

1
2
n 1+Itie  n  1
(n  1)=2


(n 1)=2
t (1 t)(n 1)=2 t = 1; 2: (A.21)
Thus:
pcBt pc1t =

1
2
n 1+Itie

(n 1)=2
t (1 t)(n 1)=2

n  1
(n+ 1)=2

1  t
t

+

n  1
(n  1)=2

with t = 1; 2: If 1 2 (0; 1) we can write:
pcB2   pc12
pcB1   pc11 =

2(1  2)
1(1  1)
(n 1)=2
1
2

n  1 + 22
n  1 + 21

or, again taking into account that 1 = 1  2 and simplifying:
pcB2   pc12
pcB1   pc11 =

1
1  1

n+ 1  21
n  1 + 21

(A.22)
The right-hand side of (A.22) is strictly increasing in 1, and equals 1 at
1 = 1=2; thus (pcB2   pc12)=(pcB1   pc11) < 1 for all 1 < 1=2. It follows that
if vc1  vc2, xc1 = 1 +B is indeed the chairs best response strategy.
Finally, given 1 < 1=2, could the chair gain by changing the order of pro-
posals? Two deviations need to be ruled out. The chair could choose P1 such
that vc1 < vc2 and (i) cast the bonus vote on P2, or (ii) still cast the bonus
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vote on P1. Call vc  maxfvc1; vc2g and vc  minfvc1; vc2g. The rst deviation
is ruled out if: pcB1vc + pc12vc  pc11vc + pcB2vc , or vc ( pcB1  pcB2)  vc(
pc11  pc12). Given vc  vc and pcB1 > pc11, pcB2 > pc12, a su¢ cient con-
dition is then (pcB1   pc11)  (pcB2   pc12) which we know satised for all
1 < 1=2: the deviation cannot be protable. The second deviation is ruled out
if: pcB1vc + pc12vc  pcB1vc + pc12vc , or vc ( pcB1  pc12)  vc( pcB1  pc12),
or pcB1  pc12  0. This can be veried immediately from (A.20) and (A.21)
above: again the deviation cannot be protable.
We can conclude that for both n odd and n even, the strategies described
in the rst half of the Proposition are indeed equilibrium strategies. But with
T = 2, the two proposals are completely symmetrical, and the proof can be
applied identically to proposal 2. The two equilibria are mirror-images of each
other, and are payo¤-equivalent.
(3) The proposition states that no other quasi-symmetric informative equi-
libria exist for all n and G. We need to rule out partially informative equilibria
where the chair sets his highest priority proposal as P1 (or P2) with some proba-
bility 2 (1=2; 1). With T = 2, such equilibria do indeed exist when n is even. But
suppose n = 3. Consider candidate informative equilibria where c1 2 (1=2; 1].
Taking into account 2 = 1  1 and c2 = 1  c1:
pB1   p11 = (1  1c1)=8
pB2   p12 = (c1 + 1   1c1)=8
If c1+1 > 1, then pB2  p12 > pB1  p11, implying 1 < 1=2. But we showed
above that if 1 < 1=2, the chairs best response is to choose P1 such that vc1 
vc2 and always cast the bonus vote on P1. The only symmetric best response for
the other voters then is to cast the bonus vote on P1 if and only if v1  (3; G)v2,
an event that occurs with probability e1 2 (0; 1=2) - the equilibrium strategy
characterized earlier. If c1 + 1  1, then pB2   p12  pB1   p11, implying
1  1=2; but c1 > 1=2, and thus c1 + 1 > 1, a contradiction. Identical
reasoning rules out any informative equilibrium with c2 2 (1=2; 1] that would
di¤er from the second equilibrium characterized in the Proposition.
The focus of the analysis, and the denition of informative equilibria stress
the possibility to transmit information on the chairs priorities. But could the
order of proposals be used to transmit information about the chairs direction
of preferences, as opposed to the chairs intensity of preferences? With T = 2,
could there be an equilibrium where if there is at least one proposal the chair
favors, it will be ordered rst, and if there is at least one proposal the chair
opposes it will be ordered last? Call dt the probability that the chair favors Pt
- is there an equilibrium where d1 > 1=2 and d2 < 1=2? The answer is that no
such equilibrium can exist for all n. Intuitively, transmitting information about
ones priorities can encourage allies to withdraw their bonus vote, relative to
voters with opposite preferences, reducing the chairs probability of winning the
current proposal, and because preferences are independent across proposals and
voters no future benet can accrue to the chair from the reallocation of available
bonus votes among the other voters. Suppose for example n = 3, and call i and
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j non-chair voters such that vi1 > 0 and vj1 < 0 Then:
pB1i   p11i = [1  1   d1(1  21 + 1c1)]=4
pB1j   p11j = [1  1   (1  d1)(1  21 + 1c1)]=4
It can be veried immediately that (pB1i   p11i) < (pB1j   p11j) i¤ d1 > 1=2.
Hence the threshold value of v1=v2 that induces a voter to cast the bonus vote
on P1 is higher if the voter agrees with the chair. As a result the chair would
be better o¤ by lying. The argument extends unchanged to T > 2, and the
possibility of equilibria of this type is not discussed further. 
Proof of Proposition 5. For S = 0, the equilibrium falls under Proposition
3; for T = 2, and S = 1, the equilibrium falls under Proposition 4. Consider
then S > 0 and T > 2. Call PS the set of S proposals ordered by the chair
in the rst S positions of the agenda, and PT S the set of T   S proposals
ordered in the last T   S positions. The proof is logically identical to the proof
of Proposition 4.
(1) Suppose rst n = 4. Consider the best response strategy for voter i, who
is not the chair. Voter i casts the bonus vote on proposal Pt over proposal Ps if
the ratio vit=vis is larger than:
pBs   p1s
pBt   p1t =
3  s(2  s)  cs(1  2s)
3  t(2  t)  ct(1  2t) (A.23)
where the right-hand side of (A.23) is derived taking into account B 2 B(4), as
in the proof of Proposition 4 (but allowing c to di¤er from 0 or 1). If Ps and Pt
2 PS , then in the candidate equilibrium ct = cs = 0, and t, the probability
that the other non-chair voter in the 3-person committee casts his bonus vote
on Pt, must equal prob(vjt = vjS)prob(v

jS > (1=)v

jT  S) = (1=S)prob(v

jS >
(1=)vjT  S) = r. Thus the ratio on the right-hand side of (A.23) is equal to 1,
and i will cast his bonus vote on Pt, as opposed to Ps, only if vit > vis. Among
all proposals in PS , the only candidate for is bonus vote is the highest intensity
proposal in the set, P iS . Similarly, if Ps and Pt 2 PT  S , then in the candidate
equilibrium ct = cs = 1=(T   S), and t = prob(vjt = vjT  S)prob(vjT  S >
vjS) = 1=(T S)prob(vjT  S > vjS) = s. Again, the ratio on the right-hand
side of (A.23) equals 1, and among all proposals in PT  S , the only candidate
for is bonus vote is the highest intensity proposal in the set, P iT  S . Suppose
then Pt = P iT  S and Ps = P

iS (note that this case is only relevant if S > 0).
The ratio in (A.23) becomes:
pBs   p1s
pBt   p1t =
3 + 2s   2s
3  t(2  t)  (1  2t)=(T   S) (A.23)
where s = (1=S)[1 t(T  S)]. We can write the right-hand side of (A.23) as
some function (t). Voter is best response is to cast his bonus vote on P iT  S
if and only if viT  S  (t)viS . Thus in a quasi-symmetrical equilibrium t,
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the probability that a non-chair voter in the committee casts his bonus vote on
Pt, must equal prob(vjt = vjT  S)prob(v

jT  S > (t)v

jS). Or:
t =
Z 1
0

F

v
(t)
S
[F (v)]
T S 1
dF (v)   (t) (A.24)
Both  and  are continuous in t. Note that lim1!0 (t) 2 (0; 3=2) for all
S < T , and hence limt!0  (t) > 0; while (t)jt=1=T > 1 for all T > 2, and
hence  (t)jt=1=T < 1=T . It follows that (A.24) must have a solution at someet < 1=T where ( et) = (4; G; T; S) > 1. In addition, for all S < T   1,  is
strictly increasing in t, for all t 2 [0; 1=(T   S)], and thus  must be strictly
decreasing, and et must be unique. If S = T   1, limt!1=(T S) (t) = 1, and
hence lim1!1=(T S)  (t) = 1=T ; but @=@t has a unique root, a maximum,
at some 0t < 1=T (and thus  has a unique minimum at 
0
t), implying that
equation (A.24) again has a unique solution: (4; G; T; S) is unique. Finally,
notice that for all ( et) > 1,  ( et) must be lower the higher is S, and thus
for given G and T , et must be lower the higher is S. The highest admissible
value of S is S = T   1 or T   S = 1 the fully informative equilibrium: et is
monotonically lower the more informative is the equilibrium.
Consider now the chairs problem. Given the order of the proposals and the
other votersposited strategies, the only possible targets for the chairs bonus
vote are his highest intensity proposals in the two sets, P cT  S and P

cS (because
in all comparisons between proposals Ps and Pt in the same set, whether PS or
PT  S , t = s and thus (pcBs   pc1s)=(pcBt   pc1t) = 1). Suppose then Pt =
P iT  S and Ps = P

iS , and recall that in the candidate equilibrium v

cT  S  vcS .
With B 2 B(4) and n = 4:
pcBs   pc1s
pcBt   pc1t =

1  s(1  s)
1  t(1  t)

an expression smaller than 1 for all s > t. Thus if vcT  S  vcS , it is indeed
optimal for the chair to cast his bonus vote on P iT  S . Can the chair do better
by deviating in the order of the proposals? As in the proof of Proposition 4,
two possible deviations must be considered. First, the chair could order his
highest intensity proposal in the rst S positions on the agenda, and cast on it
his bonus vote. Second, the chair could order his highest intensity proposal in
the rst S positions, but cast his bonus vote on P cT  S . Using the index t to
refer to a proposal in PT  S and the index s to refer to a proposal in PS , the
rst deviation is ruled out if vc (pcBt  pcBs) > vc(pc1t  pc1s) for all vc  vc . A
su¢ cient condition then is (pcBt  pc1t) > (pcBs  pc1s), which we know satised
for all s > t. The rst deviation cannot be protable. The second deviation
is ruled out if vc ( pcBt  pc1s) > vc( pcBt  pc1s) for all vc  vc . A su¢ cient
condition then is pcBt > pc1s. it is not di¢ cult to verify that pcBt > p, while
pc1s < p, implying that the second deviation cannot be protable either.
Finally, Proposition 5 states that the chair will order his S lowest intensity
proposals in the rst S positions of the agenda. Because the bonus vote is spent
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on vc , the stated ordering is indeed a best response for the chair if pc1t > pc1s,
which again is immediately veried, given t < s < 1=2.
(2) Suppose now n = 3. The logic proceeds identically. Again, consider the
best response strategy for voter i, who is not the chair. Voter i casts the bonus
vote on proposal Pt over proposal Ps if the ratio vit=vis is larger than:
pBs   p1s
pBt   p1t =
1  scs
1  tct (A.25)
where the right-hand side of (A.25) is derived taking into account B 2 B(3). If
Ps and Pt 2 PS , or if Ps and Pt 2 PT  S , in the candidate equilibrium the ratio
on the right-hand side of (A.25) equals 1: only P iS and P

iT  S are candidates
for is bonus vote. Suppose then Pt = P iT  S and Ps = P

iS (and S > 0). The
ratio in (A.25) becomes:
pBs   p1s
pBt   p1t =
1
1  t=(T   S) (A.25)
Call the right-hand side of (A.25) (t). Voter is best response is to cast
the bonus vote on Pt if and only if viT  S  (t)viS . Thus t = prob(vjt =
vjT  S)prob(v

jT  S > v

jS). In a quasi-symmetrical equilibrium, t must solve:
t =
Z 1
0

F

v
(t)
S
[F (v)]
T S 1
dF (v)  (t)
Both  and  are continuous in t. Note that limt!>0 (t) = 1, and hence
limt!>0 (t) = 1=T > 0; while (t)j1=1=T > 1 for all nite T , and hence
(t)jt=1=T < 1=T . In addition,  is everywhere increasing in t, and thus
 is everywhere decreasing in t. It follows that  (A.26) must have a unique
solution at some et 2 (0; 1=T ). Thus (t)jt=ft  (3; G; T; S) > 1 for all
G;T; S, with S > 0. Note that for all ( et) > 1, ( et) must be lower the higher
is S, and thus for given G and T , et must be lower the higher is S. As in the
case of n = 4, et is monotonically lower the more informative is the equilibrium.
Consider now the chairs problem. As argued earlier, given the order of
the proposals and the other votersposited strategies, the only possible targets
for the chairs bonus vote are his highest intensity proposals in the two sets,
P cT  S and P

cS . Suppose then Pt = P

iT  S and Pr = P

iS , and recall that in the
candidate equilibrium vcT  S  vcS . With B 2 B(3) and n = 3:
pcBr   pc1r
pcBt   pc1t =

1  2r
1  2t

an expression smaller than 1 for all r > t. Thus with vcT  S  vcS , it is
indeed optimal for the chair to cast his bonus vote on P iT  S . Can the chair do
better by deviating in the order of the proposals? Once again, two deviations
must be considered: (1) The chair could order his highest intensity proposal in
the rst S positions on the agenda, and cast on it his bonus vote; (2) the chair
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could order his highest intensity proposal in the rst S positions, but cast his
bonus vote on P cT  S . Using the index t to refer to a proposal in PT  S and the
index s to refer to a proposal in PS , the rst deviation is ruled out if vc ( pcBt 
pcBs) > vc( pc1t  pc1s) for all vc  vc . A su¢ cient condition then is ( pcBt 
pc1t) > ( pcBs  pc1s), a condition we know satised for all t < s. The rst
deviation cannot be protable. The second deviation is ruled out if vc ( pcBt 
pc1s) > vc( pcBt  pc1s) for all vc  vc . A su¢ cient condition then is pcBt >
pc1s. But as in the case of n = 4, pcBt > p, while pc1s < p, implying that the
second deviation cannot be protable either.
Finally, Proposition 5 states that the chair will order his S lowest intensity
proposals in the rst S positions of the agenda. Because the bonus vote is spent
on vc , the stated ordering is indeed a best response for the chair if pc1t > pc1s,
which again is immediately veried with t < r < 1=2 for all T > 2.
(3) To show claim (2) in the proposition, it su¢ ces to show that no other
quasi-symmetrical equilibrium exists when n = 3. In the equilibria characterized
by the proposition: (i) If the chair randomizes over P c s position in the agenda,
he randomizes with equal probabilities. To show that this must be true, consider
proposals in positions r and t, and suppose cr > ct > 0. With n = 3, voter
i who is not chair prefers to cast his bonus vote on Pr relative to some other
proposal Ps if vir=vis  (1   rcr)=(1   scs), and similarly for Pt. It then
follows immediately that any quasi-symmetrical equilibrium where cr > ct
must have r < t. But for the chair this implies (pcBr   pc1r) > (pcBt   pc1t):
in any realization where the chair orders P c as Pt, he can do strictly better
by exchanging Pt and Pr, and thus ordering P c as Pr and casting his bonus
vote on Pr. If cr > ct, then ct = 0. cr > ct > 0 cannot be supported
in equilibrium. (In fact, the same argument holds for n = 4 if T > 2). (ii)
Given the chairs strategy, the only candidates for non-chair voter is bonus
vote are proposals P iS and P

iT  S . To show that this must be true, again
consider the ratio (pcBr   pc1r)=(pcBt   pc1t). When both Pr and Pt belong
to PS , cr = ct = 0; therefore with n = 3, (pcBr   pc1r)=(pcBt   pc1t) = 1,
and is best response is to cast the bonus vote on Pr rather than Pt if and only
if vir > vit. The conclusion follows. When both Pr and Pt belong to PT  S ,
cr = ct = 1=(T   S). Suppose r > t; then (pcBr   pc1r)=(pcBt   pc1t) <
1, and voter is best response results in casting the bonus vote on Pt more
frequently than on Pr: any quasi-symmetrical equilibrium requires r = t,
and thus(pcBr   pc1r)=(pcBt   pc1t) = 1, and the conclusion follows. Thus for
n = 3, the only payo¤-distinct informative equilibria are the ones described in
the proposition, and claim (2) is established. 
Proof of Proposition 6. In all informative equilibria, S > 0, and:
EV Sc = (pcBt   pc1t)Ev(T ) +
SX
r=1
Ev(r)(pc1s   pc1t) + TEvpc1t: (A.27)
with the probabilities amended to take into account the voting strategies of the
other committee members and derived above in the proofs to Propositions 4
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and 5. Propositions 4 and 5 imply t  1=T and s = [1  (T  S)t]=S  1=T .
If t = 1=T , then s = 1=T , pc1s = pc1t and EV Sc = EV
N
c . Thus the proof
of the proposition amounts to showing that EV Sc is strictly declining in t for
all t 2 [t; 1=T ] where t is the lower bound on possible equilibrium values of
t. Because t and the probabilities pcBt, pc1t, and pc1s depend on n; T; S; and
B the di¤erent cases need to be studied separately. The proof is tedious but
straightforward.
(i) Consider rst the equilibria described in Proposition 4, where T = 2 and
S = 1: (A.27) can be rewritten as:
EV Sc = (pcB1   pc1s)Ev(T ) + Tpc1sEv: (A.28)
As shown in the proof to Proposition 4, if n is even (n;G; S) = 1, or corre-
spondingly 1 = 1=T . Thus EV FIc = EV
N
c = EVc for all n even. Consider then
n odd. Substitute pcB1 and pc1s in (A.28) from (A.20) and (A.21), taking into
account that T = 2, and thus 2 = 1   1. Di¤erentiating with respect to 1,
we obtain:
@EV Sc
@1
< 0() Ev(2)
Ev
>
2(n+ 1)1(21   1)
(n+ 1)1(21   1) + (1  1)[3  n+ 2(n  1)] :
(A.29)
The condition is always satised if the ratio on the right-hand side of (A.29) is
smaller than 1. But:
2(n+ 1)1(21   1)
(n+ 1)1(21   1) + (1  1)[3  n+ 2(n  1)] < 1() 41 3+n(1 21)
2 < 0:
This latter inequality is guaranteed satised if 1 2 [((n 1) 
p
n+ 1)=(2n); 1=2].
The proof of Proposition 4 establishes a lower bound 1 on 1, where 1 is the
solution to (1) = 1 (and thus '(1) = 1=2). Solving (1) = 1, we obtain:
1 =
1
4
h
3  n+
p
(n  3)(n+ 1)
i
>
(n  1) +pn+ 1
2n
:
Thus the ratio on right-hand side of (A.29) is smaller than 1 for all 1 2 [1; 1=2],
implying that EV Ic is declining in 1 over all values of 1 in that range, and
thus EV Sc (e1) > EV Sc j1=1=2 = EVc:
(ii) Consider now the equilibria described in Proposition 5, where n 2 f3; 4g
and B 2 B(n). Suppose rst n = 3. With n = 3 and B 2 B(n):
pcBt   pc1t = (1  t)
2
8
+
t(1  t)
4
pc1s   pc1t = t(1  t)
4
  s(1  s)
4
pc1t = (3=4)  t(1  t)
4
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and recall that s = [1   (T   S)t]=S. Di¤erentiating (A.27) with respect to
t, we obtain:
@EV Sc
@t
=
1
4S2
"
 Ev(T )tS2 + Ev(2t   1)S2T +
SX
r=1
Ev(r)[S(2 + T   4tT ) + 2T (tT   1)]
#
(A.30)
It is not di¢ cult to verify that @2EV Sc =@
2
t > 0, and thus (A.30) is maximal at
t = 1=T . But:
@EV Sc
@t

t=1=T
=
 1
4S2
"
SEv(T ) + T (T   2)(SEv +
SX
r=1
Ev(r))
#
< 0
and thus (A.30) is negative for all t 2 [0; 1=T ]. Notice that although we know
that t is smaller the higher is S, the observation does not imply that (A.27)
must be higher the higher is S because at higher S the number of terms in the
summation increase, and (pc1s   pc1t) < 0 for all t < 1=T .
Suppose now n = 4. With n = 4 and B 2 B(n):
pcBt   pc1t = 3
16
[1  t(1  t)]
pc1s   pc1t = 3
16
t[1  t(1  t)]  3
16
s[1  s(1  s)]
pc1t = (11=16)  3
16
t[1  t(1  t)]
Di¤erentiating (A.27) with respect to t, we obtain:
@EV Sc
@t
=
1
16
"
 3Ev(T )(1  2t)  3TEv(1  2t + 32t ) +
1
S3
SX
r=1
Ev(r)A(t)
#
(A.31)
where:
A(t)  9T (1  tT )2 + 3S(1  tT )(9tT   3  2T ) +
+3S2[2 + T   t(6 + 4T   9tT )]
If A(t) < 0, then @EV Sc =@t < 0 and the proof is concluded. If A(t) > 0,
then @EV Sc =@t is increasing in
PS
r=1Ev(r). But
PS
r=1Ev(r) < SEv, and thus
@EV Sc =@t must be negative if:
 3Ev(T )(1  2t)  Ev[3T (1  2t + 32t ) 
1
S2
A(t)] < 0
Manipulating this expression, we obtain 3T (1  2t + 32t )  1S2A(t) > 0()
3  2S   3t(T   2S) < 0. It is not di¢ cult to see that the condition must be
satised for all S > 1. When S = 1, the condition requires t > 1=(3T   6).
But if S = 1, t = 1=(1+
p
1 + T (T   1)) > 1=(3T   6) for all T > 3. The only
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remaining case is then S = 1, T = 3. But it is then immediate to verify that
for S = 1, T = 3, @EV Sc =@t < 0 for all t > 0:131, a condition that must be
satised for all t 2 [t; 1=T ] since t = 1=(1 +
p
7) = 0:274. Thus (A.31) must
be always negative for all t 2 [t; 1=T ], and the proof is concluded.
Equilibria of the experimental treatments. (1). The existence of the
NI and PI equilibria, and of the FI equilibrium where the chair orders P c as
the third proposal follows from Proposition 5. The FI equilibrium where P c is
ordered second mirrors the payo¤-equivalent equilibrium where P c is ordered
third - voting choices over the last proposal are residual, and the chair cannot
a¤ect any non-chair strategy by deviating o¤ equilibrium and not casting the
bonus vote on P2. The FI equilibrium where P c is ordered rst does require
the specication of o¤-equilibrium beliefs that can support it as a sequential
equilibrium. Plausible beliefs c2 = c3 = 1=2, were the chair to deviate and not
cast the bonus vote on P1, are su¢ cient for the purpose: they guarantee 2 > 1
and thus support the chairs equilibrium strategy. (2) Showing that with the
experimental parameterization no other equilibrium exists is more cumbersome,
but again builds on arguments used in the proofs to the propositions. For
n = 3, the proof of Proposition 1 shows that no other NI equilibrium exists;
the proof of Proposition 5 shows that in the PI equilibrium the chair must
randomize the order of P c over positions fT   S; ::; Tg with equal probability,
and that in all equilibria the only candidates for non-chair voter is bonus vote
are proposals P iS and P

iT  S . When T = 3, all results hold true for n = 4 and
because the proofs follow the identical logic, I do not repeat them here. These
results establish that no other payo¤-distinct quasi symmetrical informative
equilibrium exists; that the NI equilibrium is unique, and that all FI equilibria
are as described. To establish that the list of equilibria in the text is exhaustive,
then, one result is missing: we need to show that with T = 3 and n 2 f3; 4g, the
PI equilibrium remains unique when we allow for payo¤-equivalent equilibria.
This is the purpose of the following Lemma:
Lemma: With T = 3 and n 2 f3; 4g, there is a unique PI equilibrium,
and in such equilibrium the chair orders his lowest intensity proposal as P1:
PT  S = fP2; P3g.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that PT  S = fP1; P3g: the chair orders his
lowest intensity proposal as P2, and casts his bonus vote with equal probability
on P1 and P3: c1 = c3 = 1=2; c2 = 0. If such an equilibrium exists, a non-
chair voter must cast his bonus vote either on P2 or on P T  S which is equally
likely to be P1 or P3. Hence, with n = 3, and following (A25): 1 = prob(vi1 =
maxfvi1; vi3g)prob(maxfvi1; vi3g > (2vi2)=(2   1)). But if the chairs bonus
vote is not cast on P1, then, under the candidate strategy, it must be cast on P3
with probability 1. Non-chair voters will then cast their bonus vote on P3 with
probability n3 = prob(vi3 = maxfvi1; vi3g)prob(maxfvi1; vi3g > vi2=(1   n3 )),
where the superscript n indicates that the probability has been updated after
the chair failed to cast his bonus vote on P1:But then n3 < 1 (in the Uniform
parameterization n3 = 1=4 and 1 = 2=7): the chair can gain from deviating
and always ordering P c as P3, and the scenario cannot be an equilibrium. With
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n = 4, the relevant probabilities are given by (A.23), but the logic is identical
(in the Uniform parameterization n3 = 0:274 and 1 = 0:307). Finally, the same
logic also establishes that there cannot be an equilibrium withPT  S = fP1; P2g.

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9 Appendix B. Sample instructions (n = 3)
9.1 General Instructions
This is an experiment in group decision making. By following the instructions
and making careful decisions you will earn varying amounts of money, which
will be paid at the end of the experiment. Your earnings will depend partly on
your decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and partly on chance.
The entire experiment will take place through computer terminals, and your
interaction with other participants will take place through the computers. It is
important that you do not talk or in any way try to communicate with other
participants during the experiment.
We will start with a brief instruction period. During the instruction period,
you will be given a complete description of the experiment and will be shown
how to use the computers. If you have any questions during the instruction
period, raise your hand and your question will be answered out loud so that
everyone can hear. If any di¢ culties arise after the experiment has begun, raise
your hand, and an instructor will come and assist you.
9.2 Decision Problem
The decision problem you are participating in is about voting. In this experi-
ment, you will participate in 40 independent voting sessions. At the beginning
of the experiment you will be randomly assigned to a group of three people.
This will be your group for the entire experiment. Each group follows exactly
the same rules and what happens in one group has no e¤ect on the other groups.
In each session, you and the other members of your group will be asked to
vote over three successive proposals, each of which can either pass or fail. The
proposals are called Green Proposal, Blue Proposal, and Red Proposal. Each
member of a group has one regular vote to be cast for each proposal. In addition,
each member will be given one extra bonus vote. You will choose in which of
the three proposals you want to cast the bonus vote in addition to your regular
vote.
At the beginning of a session you will be assigned a personal Green Proposal
Value, Blue Proposal Value, and Red Proposal Value. Each of the three values
is equally likely to be any integer amount between  100 and 100, but not zero.
The three values are assigned randomly and thus will generally be di¤erent.
The other members of your group are also randomly assigned their own Green
Proposal Values, Blue Proposal Values, and Red Proposal Values each of which
is equally likely to be any integer amount between  100 and 100, but not zero.
Because the values are random, each person is likely to have di¤erent values
for the three proposals, and the values of each proposal (for example the Green
Proposal Values) are also likely to be di¤erent for three di¤erent persons. You
are not told what the values of the other members of your group are.
If your value is positive, you are in favor of the proposal and earn your value
if and only if the proposal passes. If your value is negative, you are against the
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proposal and earn the absolute value of your value if and only if the proposal
does not pass. Otherwise you earn 0 francs. For example, if your Green Proposal
Value is  55, then you earn 55 francs if Green does not pass, and 0 francs if
Green passes (and similarly for Blue and Red proposals). Because the values
are randomly assigned, being in favor of one proposal carries no implication for
how you feel about the other.
As mentioned earlier, the three elections are held sequentially. Each member
of the group will cast one regular vote in each proposal. In addition, each
member will be given one extra bonus vote and will choose in which of the three
proposals s/he wants to cast the bonus vote in addition to his/her regular vote.
Suppose for example that the rst election is on the Blue proposal. Then you
will decide whether to cast 1 or 2 votes in the Blue election: your regular Blue
vote only, or your regular Blue vote and the bonus vote. The other members
of your group may also cast up to 2 votes in the Blue election. If you are in
favor of the Blue proposal (that is, your Blue Proposal Value is positive), any
votes you cast will automatically be counted as YES votes. If you are against
Blue (that is, your Blue Proposal Value is negative), any votes you cast will be
automatically counted as NO votes. The Blue proposal passes in your group if
there are more YES votes than NO votes cast by members of your group and
fails if there are more NO votes than YES votes. Ties are broken randomly by
the computer.
After you and the other members of your group have made voting decisions
for the rst proposal, the computer will tell you the number of votes cast for
and against the proposal, and the outcome of the vote for your group. You will
then proceed to the second proposal.
Continuing with the example, suppose that the second election is the Green
election. In the Green election each member of your group (including you) have
his or her regular green vote, plus the bonus vote, unless the bonus vote was
cast earlier in the Blue election. If you cast 2 votes in the Blue election, you
will have only 1 vote in the Green election; but if you cast 1 vote in the Blue
election, you will have up to 2 votes in the Green election. Your screen will
display how many votes you and the other members of your group have left.
Again, after you and the other members of your group have made voting
decisions for the Green proposal, the computer will tell you the number of votes
cast for and against the proposal, and the outcome of the vote for your group.
You will then proceed to the third proposal.
Your screen will display how many votes you and the other members of your
group have left for the third proposal, the Red proposal in the example. You
do not have any choice about how many votes to cast in this third election, but
by clicking the VOTE button, you will cast all your remaining votes. These
votes will automatically be cast as YES vote for the Red Proposal if your Red
Proposal Value is greater than 0 and as NO vote if your Red Proposal Value is
less than 0. Your groups outcome of the Red election is then reported to you.
When everyone has nished we will go to the next voting session, that is to
another set of three sequential elections. You will repeat the procedure described
above for 10 sessions.
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In the rst 10 sessions, after all personal values have been assigned, the com-
puter randomly chooses the order in which the three proposals will be voted,
and you will be informed about this order. In the following 10 sessions (i.e.
sessions 11-20), after all personal values have been assigned, the computer ran-
domly assigns a member of the group to be the Chair for the next 10 sessions.
The Chair decides the order in which the three elections will be held. You will
see on your computer monitor whether you have been chosen to be the Chair.
If so, you will be asked to choose the order of the proposals; if not you will
be told what order of elections the Chair has chosen. Voting then proceeds as
we described earlier. After the 20th session, the computer will again randomly
assign one of the two other members of the group as chair for the next 10 ses-
sions (i.e. sessions 21-30) and the same procedure will take place. Finally, the
last member of the group will be the chair in the last 10 sessions (i.e. sessions
31-40.)
9.3 Payo¤s
Everyone will be paid in private and you are under no obligation to tell others
how much you earned. Your earnings during the experiment are denominated
in francs. At the end of 40 voting sessions, the computer will randomly select
one from sessions 1-10, 11-20, 21-30 and 31-40. The sum of your earnings in
these four sessions will determine your total earning. Your dollar earnings are
determined by dividing your earnings in francs by a conversion rate. In this
experiment, the conversion rate is 18, meaning that
$1 = 18 francs,
This amount will then be added to the $7.00 participation fee to determine
your nal payment. Payments will be made in private via petty cash vouchers
at the conclusion of the experiment.
9.4 Rules
Please do not talk with anyone during the experiment. We ask everyone to
remain silent until the end of the last decision problem.
Your participation in the experiment and any information about your earn-
ings will be kept strictly condential. Your receipt of payment and consent form
are the only places on which your name will appear. This information will be
kept condential in the manner described in the consent form.
If you have any questions please ask them now. If not, we will have a practice
round before we proceed to the paid session.
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Figure 1 
Share of full efficiency as function of the number of voters 
G Uniform, T=3, B=1 
 
 
 
 
                
               
 
 
                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
The black dots correspond to storable votes, and the red dots to simple majority. 
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Figure 2. Expected utility in the fully informative equilibrium 
G Uniform, n=3 and n=4, B=1. 
 
 
Figure 2a: Relative to the non-informative equilibrium, as function of T. 
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Figure 2b.Relative to expected utility with majority voting, as function of T. 
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 The upper black dots refer to the chair; the lower black dots to a representative voter who is not 
the chair, and the red dots to ex ante expected welfare with equal probability of being chair.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
The chair’s ordering strategy. 
 
Fraction of chairs whose ordering is always consistent with informative equilibria.  
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Figure 4 
                                                      Aggregate error rates, by treatment and equilibrium. 
 
 
Figure 4a 
                                                                                      Full sample 
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                                                                                        Subsamples 
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Figure 5  
 Histograms of individual error rates 
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Endogenous order (74 subjects) 
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Figure 6 
Experimental payoff (as share of available surplus) 
 
 
Figure 6a: Experiment vs. equilibrium  
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Figure 6b: Experiment vs. majority voting 
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